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WHEN PATIENTS ARE THEIR OWN DOCTORS: ROE V. WADE IN AN ERA OF SELF-MANAGED CARE

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ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade framed the abortion right as a right to make the abortion decision in consultation with a “responsible physician.” Under this framing, doctors were cast in the role of medical “gatekeepers” to mediate patient access to abortion. In the ensuing years, the doctor-patient relationship has become the site of restrictive abortion regulations in many states. This Article argues that Roe’s framing suffers from a foundational flaw: While the gatekeeper framing may have been appropriate in the Roe era when abortion was surgical and non-clinical abortions were potentially lethal, today, medication abortion—a two-drug non-surgical regimen that can safely and effectively terminate a pregnancy at home—renders the Court’s gatekeeper framing obsolete and no longer reflects the technological or medical realities of abortion-related healthcare. This Article reasserts the constitutional right of abortion and argues that advances in medical technology call for a new framing for the right as one of direct access to abortion that is not dependent upon the provider-patient relationship. This framing is better suited to protect the breadth and depth of the abortion right because it reflects the new technological realities of the practice of abortion and the promise of abortion care outside of the medical gatekeeper model which has been the focus of restrictive regulation and clinic harassment.

It is a critical time to re-examine the gatekeeper framing of the abortion right considering the dramatic conservative shift in the Supreme Court that threatens Roe and in the midst of a pandemic which—in a complete reversal of the Roe period—renders in-person care by a provider potentially dangerous. In January, the Supreme Court’s first abortion decision since President Trump’s appointment of three justices, FDA v. ACOG, doubled down on the medical gatekeeper model by reinstating an FDA requirement that medication abortion pills must be dispensed in person by a provider. Re-examining the historical, social, and technological assumptions that animate the current framing of the abortion right is vital to thinking of new ways to frame and expand abortion access. Today’s online medical and pharmaceutical marketplace reveal that the Court’s confined vision of the abortion right was informed by the social and technological realities of its time, social and technological realities that no longer exist. If Roe’s cramped vision of the abortion right has run its course, as I argue here, then the movement to protect access to abortion must include direct consumer access to abortion. Empirical evidence reveals widespread use of self-managed medication abortion in the face of abortion restrictions. The shuttering of clinics as “non-essential services” during the COVID-19 pandemic and the unnecessary increased risk of clinic-based care for procedures that can be safely managed at home only amplify the need for direct-to-consumer access to abortion care. As state legislatures seek to make it easier to prosecute individuals suspected of terminating their own pregnancies, it is a crucial moment to reconsider the constitutional foundation of abortion and the right of self-managed care as a matter of criminal and reproductive justice and public health.

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INTRODUCTION

In January, the Supreme Court handed down its first abortion decision under the newly-constituted Court with three justices appointed by President Trump, most recently Amy Coney Barrett. The decision in FDA v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists reinstated a requirement that medication abortion pills—a non-surgical two-drug regimen for terminating pregnancy—must be partially dispensed in person at a clinic. A federal judge had suspended the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) in-person dispensing requirement for mifepristone during the COVID-19 pandemic because the in-person requirement unnecessarily subjected people seeking abortion to heightened risk of exposure to the virus to obtain a drug that could be safely delivered through the mail or through pharmacies. The case signals how the new conservative majority on the Supreme Court may approach future abortion cases and the likelihood that Justice Barrett’s confirmation raises the real possibility that Roe v. Wade will be overturned. The conservative shift in the federal courts generally and the Supreme Court specifically means that protecting the abortion right increasingly will take place at the state-level and at the federal administrative level—such as the FDA’s recent decision

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2 In the two-drug regimen which normally involves ingesting four pills, “mifepristone blocks progesterone, a hormone essential to the development of a pregnancy, and thereby prevents an existing pregnancy from progressing. Misoprostol, taken 24-48 hours after mifepristone, works to empty the uterus by causing cramping and bleeding, similar to an early miscarriage.” The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, WOMEN’S HEALTH POLICY FACT SHEET (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-availability-and-use-of-medication-abortion/. By contrast, there are two types of surgical abortion—aspiration and dilation & evacuation—which generally involve dilating the cervix and suctioning and/or scraping the uterine wall with a curette to expel the contents of the pregnancy. Surgical Abortion, Healthline, https://www.healthline.com/health/surgical-abortion#preparing.


to suspend the in-person dispensing requirement for mifepristone during the COVID-19 pandemic to allow medication abortion to be dispensed at pharmacies and through the mail, thereby neutralizing the Supreme Court’s decision in *FDA v. ACOG.*[^6] Last term the Supreme Court issued its decision in *June Medical Services v. Russo,*[^8] with Chief Justice Roberts joining a 5 to 4 majority, that reaffirmed the holding of *Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,*[^8] that had struck down just four years earlier a nearly identical admitting privileges law which prohibited a doctor from performing abortions in the state unless the doctor had active admitting privileges at a local hospital within thirty miles of the doctor’s clinic.[^6] Whether or not *Roe* is overturned and *June Medical’s* apparent victory is short-lived,[^10] the medical gatekeeper framing upon which these cases rest and which has been central to abortion jurisprudence over the last forty-seven years, is no longer relevant to the social and technological realities of the practice of abortion care. Indeed, it is fitting that the Court’s first abortion decision is a case involving medication abortion because, as I argue here, medication abortion represents a significant shift in the way abortion care is delivered and as a result fundamentally challenges its constitutional framing.

The Supreme Court in *Roe v. Wade* framed the abortion right as a right to make the abortion decision in consultation with a “responsible physician.”[^7a] Under this framing—what I term the medical “gatekeeper” model—providers mediate access to abortion and, in the ensuing years, the private doctor-patient relationship has become the site of restrictive abortion regulations in many states.

[^6]: In a letter dated April 12, 2021 to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the acting commissioner of the FDA, Dr. Janet Woodcock, said that the agency would temporarily stop enforcement of the in-person dispensing requirement for the first drug, mifepristone, in the two-drug medication abortion regimen. The letter noted that ”the overall findings from these studies do not appear to show increases in serious safety concerns . . . occurring with medical abortion as a result of modifying the in-person dispensing requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.” [https://twitter.com/ACOGAction/status/1381781110980501512/photo/1](https://twitter.com/ACOGAction/status/1381781110980501512/photo/1).


[^10]: Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in *June Medical* rejected the balancing test set forth in *Whole Woman’s Health* that called upon courts to weigh both the benefits and burdens of abortion restriction in the undue burden analysis. Instead, Justice Roberts retreated to the undue burden analysis of the *Casey* decision which merely required courts to consider if a restriction placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a person seeking an abortion. *June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo,* 140 S. Ct. 2103, 21302135–36 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that “[n]othing about *Casey* suggested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”). Many commentators have observed that the *June Medical* decision was not as much a victory as many have suggested. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, *Opinion: The Supreme Court’s Abortion Decision Seems Pulled from the ‘Casey’ Playbook,* WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/problem-with-relying-precedent-protect-abortion-rights/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/problem-with-relying-precedent-protect-abortion-rights/); Mary Ziegler, *Op-Ed: Why Abortion Rights Are Still at Risk,* L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2020) (noting that Justice Roberts’ decision was not based on a “newfound commitment” to the abortion right but simply his commitment to *stare decisis*). For a discussion of stare decisis in *June Medical,* see Melissa Murray, *The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent,* 134 HARV. L. REV. 308, 319–327 (2020).

Scholars have long criticized Roe v. Wade’s accommodation of the medical model of abortion reform for subordinating people’s constitutional rights to the judgment of their healthcare providers.\(^\text{11}\) This Article brings a new analysis to bear on Roe’s medical model of the abortion right to argue that the gatekeeper framing suffers from an even more foundational flaw: While the gatekeeper framing may have been appropriate in the Roe era when abortion was surgical and non-clinical abortions were potentially lethal, today, medication abortion renders the Court’s gatekeeper framing outdated and no longer reflects the technological or medical realities of abortion-related healthcare. This Article reasserts the constitutional right of abortion and argues that advances in medical technology call for a new framing for the right as one of direct access to abortion that is not dependent upon the provider-patient relationship. This framing is better suited to protect the breadth and depth of the abortion right because it reflects the new technological realities of the practice of abortion and the promise of abortion care outside of the medical gatekeeper model which has been the focus of restrictive regulation and clinic harassment. The idealized doctor-patient relationship described by the Roe Court never reflected the realities of abortion access for people living in poverty, who are disproportionately of color, or who could not afford a private physician. The stranglehold of abortion restrictions in the ensuing years has only amplified the disparate access to abortion for those who are most marginalized and vulnerable.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) See infra discussion notes 100-101 and accompanying text. Professor Reva Siegel has argued that the decision in Roe v. Wade straddled the women’s rights and the medical models of abortion rights and gave only “confused expression” to women as constitutional rights holders in the abortion decision and gave greater protection to doctors’ rights to make medical decisions than to women’s rights to control reproduction. Reva Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B. U. L. REV. 18791875, 1897 (2010). See also, Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 272-80 (1992.) (describing how Roe presented decisions about childbearing as a “private dilemma” between a patient and doctor). Nan Hunter has argued that the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade can best be understood as the Court’s attempt to delegate to physicians the juridical authority over the procreative questions presented by abortion. Nan Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 194-197 (2006). See also, LAURENCE A. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 45 (1990) (arguing that the medical model, which emphasized the role of doctors in the abortion decision, reinforced the traditional role of women as dependent and not in control of their destiny;); but see Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise—Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 932–938 (1992) (offering a critique of Tribe’s THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES); Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician’s Role in “Private” Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 183, 197-201 (1985) (describing commentary on Tribe’s theories of Roe); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199-1200 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical judgment. The Roe decision might have been less of a storm center had it homed in more precisely on the women’s equality dimension of the issue.” (citations omitted)); Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 42 (2008) (highlighting crucial language in the Roe decision that emphasized the central role of the physician in the abortion context).

\(^{12}\) See e.g., June Medical Services v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Case Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460): Brief of Amici Curiae Reproductive Justice Scholars Supporting Petitioners-Cross-Respondents, Khiana M. Bridges and Dorothy Roberts, et al., 3-4 (hereinafter “Bridges & Roberts RJ Scholars Brief”) (describing the effect that restrictive abortion regulations have of marginalized populations in Louisiana).
Mounting evidence suggests that significant numbers of pregnant people\(^{13}\)—as many as two hundred thousand in Texas alone\(^{14}\)—have successfully terminated their pregnancies using various methods including medication abortion pills procured online.\(^{15}\) The evidence that increasing numbers of individuals are safely and effectively managing their abortions without the assistance of a provider calls into question the medical gatekeeper framing upon which abortion jurisprudence rests and which has been central to abortion cases over the last forty-eight years. The Court in Roe v. Wade looked to then-current medical technology to craft the gatekeeper framing\(^{12a}\) and Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey\(^{16}\) revised Roe's trimester framework in light of new medical technology that rendered it unworkable.\(^{17}\) Both holdings provide that courts should restructure the framing of the abortion right in light of current practices and technology without disturbing its underlying foundation. This Article compares the reality of modern abortion practice against the idealized doctor-patient relationship that anchored the Roe Court’s medical gatekeeper framing and animates the undue burden analysis to argue that the current framing of the abortion right is obsolete.

Self-managed abortion via the direct-to-consumer online pharmaceutical marketplace is a revolution in abortion care unimaginable at the time the Roe Court announced that the abortion right is “inherently, and primarily, a medical decision” to be made in consultation with a “responsible physician.”\(^ {18}\) Critically, self-managed abortion falls outside of the narrow framing of the medical gatekeeper model of the abortion right. Indeed, self-managed abortion is tracking with larger trends in self-managed care including direct to consumer blood testing, fecal testing, DNA testing, self-managed gender-affirming hormone therapy\(^{19}\) and assisted reproductive technology such as ova and

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\(^{13}\) I use the term pregnant “people” instead of “women” to acknowledge that trans men and other gender-non-conforming people may also seek abortion-related healthcare and may have even more difficulty accessing reproductive healthcare than cis-women seeking abortion. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Who Has Abortions? THE NATION (Mar. 13, 2015).\(^{13}\), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/who-has-abortions/[https://perma.cc/E8GD-9S3E] (“Men have abortions. We must acknowledge and come to terms with the implicit cissexism in assuming only women have abortions.”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It has been noted that the term “pregnant people” is also reminiscent of the rhetorical sleight of hand in Geduldig v. Aiello, in which Justice Stewart famously rejected the argument that pregnancy discrimination is a form of gender discrimination because there are “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant persons” and women can belong to both categories. 417 U.S. 484, n.20 (1974). The use of the term in Geduldig to undermine gender equality and in its present usage to denote inclusivity reveals the power of terminology to transform over time.

\(^{14}\) See D. Grossman, K. White, L. Fuentes et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to Abortion Self-Induction in Texas, Research Brief, Texas Policy Evaluation Project, at 1,2 (Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter TexPEP Policy Brief] (finding that in the wake of Texas’ passage of HB2, one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country, there has been an increase in the use of self-induction abortion through medication and estimates estimating that between 100,000 and 240,000 women have attempted to end their own pregnancies. ). See also, Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of the DIY Abortion in Texas, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/ [https://perma.cc/E7P7-WJXP] (describing the rise of home-based medication abortion as a result of increased abortion provider regulations).

\(^{15}\) See discussion, infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-242 and accompanying text.


\(^{17}\) See discussion supra Section III.B.

\(^{18}\) Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 166.

\(^{19}\) It is estimated that hormone use by TGNC people who take hormones outside of physician supervision ranges from twenty-nine percent to sixty-three percent in urban areas. See, e.g., Nelson F. Sanchez, John P. Sanchez, & Ann Danoff,
sperm shopping. As a result, the ability of pregnant people to directly access safe and effective abortion medication online, completely outside of the doctor-patient relationship, upends the foundation upon which the current framing of abortion jurisprudence rests.

It is a critical time to re-examine the gatekeeper framing of the abortion right considering the significant conservative shift in the Supreme Court that threatens Roe and in the midst of a pandemic which—in a complete reversal of the Roe period—renders in-person care by a provider potentially dangerous. This Article constructs a new way to frame and expand access to abortion by re-examining the historical, social, and technological assumptions that animate the current framing of the abortion right in contrast with the new technological realities of the online medical marketplace. The analysis forged in this Article reveals that the Court’s confined vision of the abortion right was informed by the social and technological realities of its time, social and technological realities that no longer exist and should no longer guide the breadth and depth of the abortion right. If Roe’s cramped vision of the abortion right as one that requires a medical gatekeeper has run its course, as I argue here, then the movement to reassert the abortion right and protect access to abortion must include direct consumer access to self-managed abortion. Empirical evidence reveals widespread use of self-managed abortion in the face of abortion restrictions. The shuttering of clinics as “non-essential services” during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the unnecessary increased risk of clinic-based care for procedures that can be safely managed at home but for regulations that require a provider be physically present, only amplify the need for direct-to-consumer access to abortion care. As state legislatures seek to make it

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See, e.g. Meghana Keshavan, These are the Key Players in the Home Health Testing Market MEDCITY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), https://medcitynews.com/2016/01/20-key-players-in-the-direct-to-consumer-lab-testing-market/[https://perma.cc/TX6S-GD73] (describing the rise in direct-to-consumer laboratory testing, including genetic testing, fertility analyses, blood testing, and cancer screenings).

See, e.g. Kapar supra note 1 (noting that “[s]ome legal experts say [the Supreme Court after Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation] will be the most conservative Supreme Court since before World War II.”)

See, e.g. Grossman supra note 11 at 4 (finding that in Texas, self-induced abortion appeared to be more common “among women who reported barriers accessing reproductive health services.”).

easier to prosecute individuals suspected of terminating their own pregnancies\(^{16d}\), it is a critical moment to reconsider the constitutional foundation of abortion and the right of self-managed care as a matter of criminal and reproductive justice and public health.

This Article proceeds in three parts: Part I examines the current legal framing of the abortion right as one in which a doctor acts as gatekeeper to access to abortion. It traces the history of early abortion regulation up to Roe as well as the technological realities of abortion at the time. It draws out how central “current medical technology” of abortion care was to the Roe opinion’s medical gatekeeper model as well as subsequent cases. It shows how abortion opponents seized on the medical gatekeeper framing in Roe to restrict and regulate abortion through the doctor-patient relationship. In so doing, restrictive abortion legislation in many states has turned doctors into quasi state actors in what had previously been the private doctor-patient relationship.

Part II examines the new social and technological realities of abortion care. Specifically, it argues that the social and technological landscape which informed Roe’s framing of the medical gatekeeper model no longer exists, and in fact never existed for those who lacked the social, political, or economic privilege to access a private doctor. Next, this section examines how self-managed abortion is tracking with larger trends in the medical marketplace that has emerged in which patients act more like consumers as technology allows them to directly access healthcare through an online platform.

Part III explores the implications of replacing the outdated medical gatekeeper model of the abortion right to bring the right in line with the new technological realities in which abortion is practiced. First, it offers two constitutional foundations for the abortion right—framings foreclosed by the Roe Court’s decision—as a right to care for one’s health or the feminist vision of a right of abortion on demand. While this may be aspirational with the current make-up of the Court, it considers the broader legal landscape to re-assert the constitutional foundations of the abortion right while forging a new the way to frame the right in light of significant medical and social trends in abortion care and direct consumer access. Next, it examines how reframing the abortion right outside of the gatekeeper model would affect current restrictions on abortion access and on the criminalization of self-managed abortion for those individuals suspected of terminating their own pregnancies.

I. THE MEDICAL GATEKEEPER MODEL

In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court announced that the abortion right was, “inherently, and primarily, a medical decision” to be made in consultation with a “responsible physician.”\(^ {21}\) In so doing, the Court articulated a right of abortion that was firmly embedded in the medical model that relied on doctors to negotiate pregnant people’s access when exercising the right of abortion.\(^ {22}\) This section


\(^{22}\) See, e.g., Mary Anne Wood & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 783,783–84 (describing Roe’s vision of an abortion decision resting with the patient and doctor); Appleton, supra note 11 at 199-200 (discussing the “medical-counselor” model in which doctors actively participate in the woman’s decision-making regarding abortion).

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describes the historical context which gave rise to the Roe Court’s framing of the abortion right in the medical gatekeeper model. It examines abortion jurisprudence to reveal how, over time, abortion jurisprudence has solidified the role of doctors acting as gatekeepers to abortion access, reaching a high-water mark in the undue burden analysis of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.  

A. The History of the Medical Establishment in the Criminalization of Abortion

Historically, abortion was unregulated in the United States and was not a crime before quickening. The movement to criminalize abortion began in the 1850's when elite or “regular” doctors began to call for restrictive abortion regulation in an effort to professionalize medicine and drive out competing “lay” healers, who were primarily women and people of color. As doctors in the mid-nineteenth century began to be trained in newly-established medical schools they sought to distinguish themselves from lay practitioners and healers. Doctors used their movement to criminalize abortion as a maneuver to turn medicine from a domestic practice that took place in the home to a professional practice in the exclusive control of medically-trained doctors, who were primarily white, male, native-born, and from elite families. To do so they sought to assert their superior moral and scientific knowledge by arguing that life began at conception and therefore abortion should be criminalized because it ended a human life. Nineteenth century physicians who lobbied state legislatures for laws criminalizing abortion argued that American women were committing a moral crime because of their ignorance about the science of embryonic life and doctors needed to come to bear on the issue in order to save American women from their own ignorance. It was at this critical historical juncture that abortion was taken out of the domestic realm and professionalized into the medical realm and doctors were charged with determining when abortion would be medically “necessary” to protect the life or health of the pregnant person.

The call to criminalize abortion during this period was also fueled by fears of “race suicide” due to declining birth rates among white, Protestant, native-born married women between 1800 and

25 LUKER, supra note 24, at 15-1618. For an excellent discussion of the physician’s crusade to professionalize the practice of medicine and criminalize abortion, see JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF A NATIONAL POLICY 147-71 (Oxf. Univ. Press 1978) (describing physician’s “aggressive campaign against abortion” in the mid-nineteenth century.)
26 Id. Luker, supra note 21, at 17-18 (citations omitted).
27 Id. at 1516, 27 (citing JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 147-70 (noting that “regular” physicians who tended to be wealthier and better educated sought to distinguish themselves both scientifically and socially from competing lay practitioners)).
28 LUKER, supra note 24, at 20-21.
29 Id. at 21 (noting that indeed at the time American women did not consider early abortion to be morally wrong as reflected the prevailing attitude since ancient history).
30 Id. at 32-33.
1900 that coincided with the dramatic rise in immigration at the turn of the century. Reproduction among this group of women declined by half between 1800 and 1900, with the number of children born per married woman falling from 7.04 to 3.56. Anxiety over the falling birthrates of white upper-class women lead one opponent of abortion to observe that abortion is one great cause and reason for so few native-born children of American parents ... [and] one of the many reasons why we are fast losing our national characteristics and slowly merging into those of our foreign population, who according the United States statistics of 1870, are rearing fifty per cent, more children according to their number than Americans are doing.

As historian James Mohr has documented, abortion came into public view in the 1840’s because the practice of abortion changed from a procedure used by “desperate” single women to widespread use by white, married, Protestant, native-born middle and upper class women in order to control family size. Laws criminalizing abortion were a response to falling birthrates for “good reproduction” and the desire to control women’s fertility in service to the state in the reproduction of citizens as a bulwark to protect a white majority against the rising tide of immigration.

The American Medical Association's lobbying efforts were successful. While at the opening of the nineteenth century there were no laws in any state that prohibited abortion before quickening, by 1900 most state had laws on the books that prohibited abortion. Critically, however, the laws reflected the interests of the medical professionals who pushed for them: Rather than criminalizing abortion outright, the laws made it a crime for anyone but a licensed physician to perform an abortion and left wide discretion to doctors to determine when an abortion was “necessary” to preserve the life or health of the pregnant person. In so doing, the physicians’ lobby created a category of “justifiable” or “therapeutic” abortion and designated themselves as the sole custodians and arbiters of that decision.

31 See discussion ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE 70-72 (rev. ed. 1990) (describing that restrictions on fertility control such as contraception and criminal abortion laws were driven by white Anglo-Saxon fears of a mushrooming immigrant under-class alongside declining birthrate of native-born white Protestant married women that caused fears of “race suicide”); Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11 at 285, 297-300.
32 PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 73-74.
33 Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11 at 298 (citing James S. Whitmire, Criminal Abortion, 31 CHI. MED. J. 385, 392 (1874)).
34 MOHR, supra note 25 at 46, 86.
35 See discussion, PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 72-77; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11 at 297-300; Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. ___ n. 61-62 and accompanying text (forthcoming 2021) (describing that white fear of demographic changes taking place during the mid-1800’s drove the campaign to criminalize abortion “as a means of deterring native-born white women from terminating pregnancies and allowing the white birth rate to be overwhelmed by immigrant and non-white births.” Id.).
36 Id. at 21, 32–33.
37 Id. at 32-33.
38 Id. (noting that only ten states had laws that specified that the physician must consult with another physician before performing an abortion; two states specifically stated that “regular” physicians must make the decision; Maryland stipulated that a “respectable” physician must make the decision.).
On the eve of *Roe v. Wade*[^39] and the companion case *Doe v. Bolton*[^40] in 1973, abortion was firmly entrenched in the medical model, with the abortion decision dependent on a finding by a doctor, or often a medical review board, that an abortion was necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant person.[^41] Ironically, in the mid-1960’s it was once again the medical profession that called for legislative reform of abortion, this time as a call to liberalize abortion.[^42] Notably, physicians who called for reform of abortion laws—as opposed to their counterparts in the feminist movement who called for outright repeal of abortion laws[^43]—wanted to keep the abortion decision exclusively in the hands of doctors and sought to reform abortion laws to give greater guidance to doctors when making the decisions about whether an abortion was necessary to protect the health or life of the pregnant person.[^44] The definition of protecting “health” was broadly interpreted to include mental health and thereby gave wide discretion to doctors in making the abortion decision on behalf of their patients.[^45]

**B. Technological Realities of Performing Abortions in the Time of Roe**

Before non-surgical medication abortion was approved by the FDA in 2000[^37a], abortions performed by doctors were solely surgical abortions, called “D&Cs” or dilation and curettage.[^46] In the decades leading up to *Roe*, physicians used their medical expertise to determine which abortions were “medically necessary,” all others were by definition criminal.[^47] However, between 1900 and 1960, as

[^41]: The doctor-led medical abortion reform movement was comprised of doctors, lawyers, and public health officials who appealed to legislators to reform therapeutic abortion laws. The abortion reform movement sought to give doctors clearer guidelines and greater discretion in deciding when abortion was lawful. *See generally, Luker,* supra note 24, at 66-125 (describing abortion reform and the rise of the concept of a right to abortion); *Siegel,* Roe’s *Roots,* supra note 11, at 1879-86 (noting the American Law Institute’s efforts to liberalize abortion by providing for therapeutic abortions) (citations omitted); *Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel,* *Before Roe v. Wade: Voices That Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court’s Ruling; A Documentary History* 221, Introduction pp. 3-5 (2010).
[^42]: The “medical model” sought to give doctors greater discretion in making the abortion decision. *See Luker,* supra note 24, at 66; *Siegel,* Roe’s *Roots,* supra note 11, at 1879-86; Appleton, supra note 11, at 199-200.
[^43]: *See Luker,* supra note 24, at 9293, 95; *Greenhouse & Siegel,* supra note 41, at 35-67; Siegel, Roe’s *Roots,* supra note 11, at 1880-86.
[^44]: The medical reform model sought to vest the discretion to decide when abortion was permissible solely in the hands of the physician, rather than giving pregnant women the right to abortion “on demand.” *American Medical Association Policy Statement, June 1970, “Resolution No. 44, Therapeutic Abortion,” in Greenhouse & Siegel,* supra note 41, at 25. Justice Harry A. Blackmun had a copy of this document in his file when he was writing his opinion in *Roe v. Wade.* Id. at 26.
[^45]: *Luker,* supra note 24 at 4046-7, 66 (noting that “[a]s ‘preserving the life of the woman’ in the physical sense of the word became a medical rarity, the continuum collapsed and the consensus broke down” and “health” was more broadly construed to include physical and mental health).
[^46]: The surgical procedure is one in which the provider dilates the cervix and scrapes the uterine lining with a spoon-shaped instrument called a curette. *Dilation and Curettage,* Johns Hopkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/dilation-and-curettage-d-and-c [https://perma.cc/8Z2M-QC5T].
[^47]: *Luker,* supra note 24, at 43.

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childbirth became safer and abortions became less necessary to preserve the life of the mother, a debate arose in the medical community about which abortions were medically indicated. The therapeutic exception that placed the abortion decision exclusively in the realm of medical judgement gave rise to a wide-range of views and practices on what it meant to preserve a mother’s life. Doctors who were strict constructionists interpreted the law as permitting abortion only to prevent the death of the woman. More liberal physicians interpreted the law more broadly, however, to mean preserving the quality of a woman’s life—including economic and social considerations—as well as to preserve a woman’s health, including her mental health.

In the decades leading to Roe, an individual’s access to legal abortion depended on their ability to find a doctor who interpreted the law more liberally. Data from the period between 1926 and 1960 bears this out, with abortion in the most liberal setting fifty-five times more likely than in more conservative settings. In California, a study of twenty-six hospitals found that abortions were performed ranging from one therapeutic abortion for every 126 live births to no therapeutic abortions per 7,615 live births. As consensus among the medical community began to unravel, hospitals in the 1950’s began to implement therapeutic abortion boards to review requests for abortion. These boards generally consisted of internists, obstetrician-gynecologists, and psychiatrists and reviewed requests for abortion, with the result that abortion became less available in the hospital setting as review boards sought to act as a deterrent to abortion and approved only the most legally defensible requests for abortion.

With doctors and medical review boards charged with the task of deciding which abortions were therapeutic, access to the procedure largely depended upon whether an individual had a relationship with a private physician. A public health official observed at the time, the difference between a “therapeutic” and illegal abortion “is $300 and knowing the right person.” As a result, women of color and women living in poverty had very limited access to legal abortion in comparison to wealthier white women. For example, a study of abortion in New York’s Sloane Hospital during

48 Id. at 40, 66 (noting that “[a]s ‘preserving the life of the woman’ in the physical sense of the word became a medical rarity, the continuum collapsed, and the consensus broke down. For the first time since the nineteenth century, medical technology—in this case, advances in obstetrical science—set the state for abortion to reemerge as a political and moral issue.”); MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 6-7 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015) (noting that as abortion became safer in the second half of the twentieth century, doctors were forced to find new justifications for the procedure.).

49 Id. at 46-47.

50 Id. at 46.

51 Id. at 69.

52 Id. at 56.

53 Id. (noting that in one hospital, only one abortion was approved after the institution of the abortion review board and that some boards required sterilization as a precondition to approving the abortion request).

54 Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 948, 959 (1960).

55 See discussion, Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L. J. 2028, 2036 (2011) (describing that the harms of illegal abortion were disproportionately experienced by the poor, while their wealthy and well-connected counterparts were able access “therapeutic” abortions by asking a psychiatrist to vouch for the impact of pregnancy on their mental health.). A physician writing at the time described illegal abortion as a public health problem, describing the “inequity of application” of the medical procedure, “the woman with $300 who knows the right person and is successful in getting herself legally abortion on the private service of a voluntary hospital, in contrast to her poorer, less influential sister on the ward service of the same hospital or in a public hospital in the same city, a woman in exactly the same physical and mental state as the first one—whose application is turned down.” Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 22.
the pre-Roe period from 1950 through 1955 revealed one abortion per thirty-seven births on the private wards, and one abortion per one hundred and forty-one births on the public or “charity” wards of the hospital.56 All of the private patients but one were white, all of the public patients were Black, Asian and white.47a Once therapeutic abortion review committees were adopted between the 1940s and the 1960s, abortion access for women of color became even more rare, declining sixty-five percent among “non-whites” and forty percent among “whites.”55 Of all therapeutic abortions performed in New York City in the 1960’s, ninety percent were performed on white women.58 The lack of access to therapeutic abortion during this period resulted in increased maternal mortality rate among women of color who were forced to turn to illegal abortion.59 In the 1960’s, half of all maternal deaths among Black women were the result of illegal abortion.60 Black women supported access to family planning, including abortion, because they were disproportionately dying and harmed by illegal abortion.61 Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, who served as honorary president of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), referenced the impact of illegal abortion on women of color for her support for abortion and for establishing family planning clinics in black communities, describing that “49 percent of the deaths of pregnant black women and 65 percent of those of Puerto Rican women . . . are due to criminal amateur abortions.”62

The necessity of having a private doctor-patient relationship to access abortion care resulted in racial and class inequality in access to abortion. Thus, abortion access was much more limited for people of color and people living in poverty who relied on public health systems for their healthcare.49a

55 supra note 47 at 518.
57 Hall, supra note 47 at 518.
58 REAGAN, supra note 47. See, MELISSA MURRAY AND KRISTIN LUKER, *CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE: TEACHER’S MANUAL* 44-45 (West 2015).
59 ROBERT G. WEISBORD, *GENOCIDE? BIRTH CONTROL AND THE BLACK AMERICAN* 116 (Praeger 1975). When Governor Nelson Rockefeller vetoed a law that sought to recriminalize abortion he described the unequal access to hospital-based abortion, stating, “[t]he truth is that a safe abortion would remain the optional choice of the well-to-do woman, while the poor would again be seeking abortions at a grave risk to life in back-room abortion mills.” Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s Veto Message (May 13, 1972), reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 158, 160.
60 Between 1951 and 1962, while the death from therapeutic abortions rose from just over 25% of all maternal mortality, to a little over 42% while death rates of “non-white” pregnant women caused by abortion in this same period increased from approximately a third to a half, among Puerto Rican women from 44% to over 55%, and for white women from a little over 14% to just over 25%. See Edwin M. Gold et al. *Therapeutic Abortions in New York City: A 20-Year Review*, 55 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 964, (1965).
62 Id.; Murray, *Race-ing Roe*, supra note 35 at 19-22 (describing Black women as “especially vociferous in their desire for, and defense of, broader access to contraception and abortion” because the deleterious harms of criminal abortion fell disproportionately on Black women.).
Rather, until the 1860's, people of color and living in poverty likely had greater access to abortion care when abortion was practiced in the home before it was medicalized and then criminalized in 1860's by the medical establishment. Before abortion was criminalized in the mid-nineteenth century, people seeking abortion who could not afford a private physician could turn to lay healers for traditional herbal methods of terminating a pregnancy or bringing on “blocked,” “obstructed,” or “delayed menstruation.” Indeed, in the years before criminalization, abortion providers regularly advertised in popular newspapers and magazines with wide circulation for services aimed at helping women to “bring on ‘suppressed menses.”

Criminal or illegal abortions were commonplace in the decades before Roe for pregnant people who could not find a physician or medical review board willing to approve the abortion procedure. It is estimated that during the periods in the twentieth century that abortion was criminalized, between one in four and one in five pregnancies for women who had ever been married were terminated by abortion, most of them by illegal abortion. The rate of abortion has remained relatively constant over time despite its illegality, with modern statistics of abortion rates substantially similar to those during the period that abortion was criminalized. What is more, the data suggest that in the pre-Roe era, up to ninety percent of premarital pregnancies were terminated by abortion. Self-induced abortion methods included herbal remedies, non-prescription preparations from pharmacies, and douching with noxious substances such as bleach and lye as well as inserting instruments such as knitting needles and coat hangers into the vagina and uterus to induce miscarriage, often resulting in death or sterility. Pregnant people with means were able to seek abortion abroad in countries where abortion was legal like Japan, England, Puerto Rico, or Scandinavia. It is estimated that death as the injuries as a result of being forced to seek criminal abortion.”); REAGAN, supra note 47, at 173 (U.C. Press 1997) (describing that after 1940 when therapeutic abortions began being performed in hospitals, and illegal abortions were increasingly prosecuted, well-to-do women had greater access to abortion care than women living in poverty and women of color.).

63 LUKER, supra note 24, at 18-19.
64 Id.; see also Dishonest Advertisements, 15 BOSTON MEDICAL & SURGICAL JOURNAL 44, 265 (May 1, 18511844) (describing “shameless” advertising of abortifacients in newspapers in all of the “great Atlantic cities.”).).
65 Gebhard, et al, Pregnancy, Birth, and Abortion, 93-94; See also LUKER, supra note 24 at 49 (discussing the data on the incidence of abortion from various studies).
66 LUKER, supra note 24 at 19-20.
67 LUKER, supra note 24 at 49 (citing the Kinsey Report data and the findings of Gephardt et al).
68 . REAGAN, supra note 47, at 42-43, 208-209 (describing methods of self-inducing abortion, including inserting instruments from home such as coat hangers, knitting needles, and hair pins, drinking ergotrate and castor oil, douching with soap, lye, or bleach, and squatting in a basin of scalding hot water); see also, Carrie N. Baker, The History of Abortion Law in the United States, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (Sept. 14, 2020) (describing that in the years before Roe, desperate women inserted knitting needles, coat hangers, and doused with lye or swallowed strong drugs or chemicals) (https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book-excerpts/health-article/u-s-abortion-history/).
69 GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, “Rush” Procedure for Going to Japan, supra note 41, at 8 (describing the Society for Humane Abortion’s detailed step-by-step procedure for obtaining an abortion in Japan, from how to purchase airline tickets, to the number of yen needed for the taxi ride from the airport to the abortion clinic).
result of illegal abortion accounted for as high as one-third of all maternal deaths. The incidence of death from illegal abortion was higher for poor people seeking abortion than for wealthier people.

Thus, at the time Roe was decided, terminating a pregnancy required surgery which necessarily required a cooperative physician or medical panel, and illegal abortions were dangerous and potentially lethal. While an emerging feminist movement was beginning to mobilize for abortion on demand based on an equality argument, medical organizations were, once again, the predominant voices in the call for abortion reform. In the mid-1960’s the American Law Institute’s 1962 draft of the Model Penal Code called for reforming criminal abortion laws by legalizing therapeutic abortion. The American Medical Association’s policy statement, adopted at the 1970 annual meeting, called for abortion reform that left the abortion decision to the “sound medical judgment” of providers, describing that “abortion is a medical procedure and should be performed only by a duly licensed physician and surgeon in an accredited hospital acting after consultation with two other physicians.” The Roe decision reflects the medical reform model and was informed by the way that abortion was practiced at the time of the decision. However, on the eve of Roe, the medical gatekeeper model of abortion access was already a fallacy for all but the most privileged individuals. People of color, people living in poverty, people in rural areas without access to private physicians and hospitals had much less access to abortion under the therapeutic model. The next section will examine the feminist framing of abortion on demand, followed by section D that describes how the Roe Court rejected the feminist model and instead drew upon the therapeutic model of abortion access to identify an integral role for physicians in an individual’s access to abortion.

C. Feminist Framing of Abortion on Demand

In the years leading up to Roe there were two competing strands of litigation that challenged criminal abortion laws. Doctors’ organization sought reform of criminal abortion laws and turned to the courts seeking greater clarity about when therapeutic abortions were justified and giving doctors greater discretion to doctors when making the decision that an abortion was lawful. This “medical model” identified abortion as a medical decision to be made in consultation with a doctor. By

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71 LUKER, supra note 24, at 74. In response to concern over maternal mortality at the hands of illegal abortion providers, organization ranging from religious clergy groups to feminist organizations began organizing underground referral services providing lists of safe illegal abortion providers to pregnant people seeking to terminate their pregnancies. Letter to the Society for Humane Abortion, in GREENHOUSE & Siegel, supra note 41, at 7. The Clergymen’s Consultation Service on Abortion was a nationwide abortion referral service founded in 1967 by ministers and rabbis who referred as many as 150,000 pregnant people a year to safe and affordable abortion providers. Id. at 29.
72 See Siegel supra note 8 at 1879–83.
75 See GREENHOUSE & Siegel, supra note 41, at 22.
76 LUKER, supra note 24, at 66-125; Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 11, at 1879-86; Appleton, supra note 11 at 197-201.
77 See, e.g. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (challenging California abortion laws as infringing the constitutional rights of doctors); U.S. v. Vuitich, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193 (1973) (arguing that both a woman’s privacy right and “the physician’s right to practice his profession” could be violated by abortion restrictions); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 106-108 (1976) (holding that two doctors had standing to challenge a Missouri law that
contrast, feminists called for an outright repeal of criminal abortion laws based on arguments that abortion is a right of bodily autonomy that should rest with the pregnant person alone and identified the right as more appropriately sourced in Equal Protection than privacy. While early cases challenging criminal abortion laws where brought on behalf of physicians performing abortions, *Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz* was the first to challenge a criminal abortion statute based on the right of women to access abortion. The case, along with other early cases and accompanying amicus briefs filed in support, argued that abortion was a woman’s right based on equal protection of the law and the right of bodily autonomy rather than a right sourced in privacy. However, in the contentious battle over the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights advocates changed tack and began to denied Medicaid benefits for abortions net deemed medically necessary, holding that patients’ and physicians’ interests were one and the same. *See discussion, Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 11, at 1884; Appleton, supra note 11 at 203.*


77 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Brief for Plaintiffs, Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (No. 69 Civ. 4469) (arguing that New York’s abortion law violates the Fourteenth Amendment and imposes unequal treatment of women.). *See Nancy Starns, Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1. 2 (1988-1989) (observing that the case was the first to consider women’s rights in being denied abortions rather than doctor’s rights to perform abortions); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and the Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1395-1396 (2006) (describing the early abortion litigation animated by women’s equality and autonomy claims in abortion litigation).*

78 See also, Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D.C. Conn. 1972) (holding Connecticut’s criminal abortion ban violates the constitutional rights of women seeking abortion, finding the statute “trespasses unjustifiably on the personal privacy and liberty of its female citizenry,” Id. at 801.). *See discussion, Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 77 at 1395-96; Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights for Women, Inc. at 11-12, United States v. Vuiitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84) (arguing that criminal abortion statute at issue denies women equal protection under the Fifth Amendment to pursue education, employment, and to decide their future and under the Thirteenth Amendment based on the demands of pregnancy, childbirth, and rearing of children); Brief of Amici Curiae Joint Washington Office for Social Concern et al., at 10-11, Vuiitch (No. 84) (arguing the abortion statute violates women’s right of equal protection); First Amended Complaint at 6-7, Women of Rhode Island v. Israel, No. 4605 (D.R.I June 22, 1971) (arguing that abortion laws deny women the ability to participate in the outside world equally in violation of the Nineteenth Amendment); Brief of Amici Curiae New Women Lawyers, et al., at 24, 32, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) (arguing that ‘Texas’ and Georgia’s restrictive abortion laws violate equal protection and prevent women from fully functioning in society “in a manner that will enable them to participate as equals with men.”).
distance abortion litigation from equality claims in response to strong counter-mobilization in opposition to the ERA.  

Feminists explicitly challenged the medical gatekeeper framing that vested doctors the discretion to make decisions about abortion and argued that the abortion decision should rest solely with the pregnant person. The feminist movement called instead for abortion “on demand” to explicitly challenge the medical model of “therapeutic” abortion. Feminists argued that women should be able to access abortions as they did any other medical procedure without having to justify their choice to committees of doctors. As Betty Friedan argued in 1969,

There is only one voice that needs to be heard on the question of the final decision as to whether a woman will or will not bear a child, and that is the voice of the woman herself. . . . [In the medical model] women are the passive objects that somehow must be regulated. . . . What right has any man to say to any woman: you must bear this child?

By the end of the 1960’s, feminist organizations such as the National Organization for Women identified abortion as integral to women’s equal citizenship, describing abortion as “a basic,  

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79 See discussion, Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 77 at 1396-97 (noting that Schlafly effectively mobilized opposition to the ERA by arguing that the Amendment would usher in same-sex marriage and abortion rights. In response, abortion rights advocates explicitly distanced their claims from equality claims, engaging in “self-censorship” in an effort to simultaneously defend the ERA and abortion rights.).

80 LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 295 (2002); Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 11, at 1880.

81 LUKER, supra note 24, at 92-125; GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 35-67; Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 11, at 1880-1886.

82 See, PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 126-27; Flyer Announcing Women’s March and listing demands, in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 44. It is important to note that this framing morphed into the “right to choose” narrative of the mainstream abortion rights movement that was problematic in that it distilled the right of abortion to a right of decision-making that reinforced neoliberal conceptions of constitutional rights that failed to acknowledge that systems and structures of oppression deny individuals and communities meaningful access to “choice” in reproduction. This inclusive and intersectional analysis of reproduction within the context of systemic oppression of marginalized communities is captured by the reproductive justice movement. See generally, LORETTA J. ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION (U.C. Press 2017); JAEIL, SILLMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 127 (2004); FORWARD TOGETHER, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, https://forwardtogether.org/tools/a-new-vision/; What is RJ? SISTERSONG, https://www.sistersong.net/reproductive-justice; SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COLLECTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?ID=4051. The reproductive justice movement draws upon the work of Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration, 59 UCLA LAW REV. 1418, 1449 (“The interplay between structures and identities are key elements in understanding the ways that [women of color] are situated within and affected by the various systems of social control.”).

83 See GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 44-45.

inalienable, human, civil right.” The feminist framing of abortion on demand stood in opposition to the gatekeeper model that required a learned intermediary to access abortion.

D. Roe v. Wade: The “Responsible Physician” as Gatekeeper

In the decisions in Roe v. Wade and its companion case Doe v. Bolton, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional criminal abortion law and also rejected the medical model of abortion reform. Articulating the right of abortion in Roe, the Court combined elements of both the feminist and the medical model of abortion. On the one hand the Court announced that the right of privacy was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” and recognized the importance of the right to control their reproduction with respect to distressful life, psychological harm, and harm to women’s mental and physical health if the right is denied. However, the Court noted that the right is not absolute and did not encompass a right to abortion on demand. Rather, the Court’s decision, “vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.” While recognizing the State’s interest in protecting health and maternal life, the Roe Court stated that, “neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.” And again, “prior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.” Thus, the Roe Court both identified a constitutional right of abortion and asserted that, “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision” to be made in consultation with a “responsible physician.”

In Doe v. Bolton, decided the same day as Roe, the Court described the role of doctors in the abortion decision, “the conscientious physician . . . concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the concern of his female patients. . . . The good physician . . . will have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient.” In the succeeding years, the Court reaffirmed the role of the “trusted physician” in the abortion right. For example, three years later in Planned

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85 Id.
86 In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court rejected the medical model of abortion reform by striking down a Georgia abortion statute that was modeled on proposed model language of the American Law Institute (ALI). The statute required two physicians certify that an abortion was necessary to protect the mental or physical health of the women or the risk of birth defects, or for pregnancies that result from rape or incest. Id. at 205-206.
87 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
88 Id. at 154.
89 Id. at 166 (emphasis added). See also, Elizabeth Reilly, “The Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757, 774-77 (1998) (describing Roe’s vision of the physician as the “decider, the actor, even the rights-holder.”).
90 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 166.
93 Id. at 153.
95 Id. 196–97.
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth\(^{96}\) the Court set forth the role of the physician as central to the abortion decision: “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”\(^{97}\) In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,\(^{98}\) the Court described that, “because abortion is a medical procedure, . . . the full vindication of the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.’ The physician’s exercise of this medical judgment encompasses both assisting the woman in the decision making process and implementing her decision should she choose abortion.”\(^{99}\) Each of these cases describes a framework of the abortion right reliant upon a doctor acting as a gatekeeper to ensure that the abortion decision is appropriate.

The Roe Court’s accommodation of the medical model of abortion reform was widely criticized for subordinating women’s constitutional rights to the judgment of their healthcare providers.\(^{100}\) Professor Reva Siegel has argued that the decision in Roe v. Wade straddled the women’s rights and the medical models of abortion rights, and gave only “confused expression” to women as constitutional rights holders in the abortion decision and gave greater protection to doctors’ rights to make medical decisions than to women’s rights to control reproduction.\(^{101}\) Specifically, the Roe decision to identify doctors as central the abortion right foreclosed the feminist framing of abortion on demand—as a “right to choose”—that was gaining traction at the time of the decision.\(^{102}\) The framing of the abortion right as a medical decision between pregnant patients and their doctors established the role of doctors as gatekeepers in accessing the constitutional right of abortion. In so doing, the opinion identified doctors as the mechanism for mediating pregnant people’s right to access care necessary to exercise the constitutional right of bodily autonomy.\(^{103}\) Scholars have argued that the Court’s decision was intended to place in the hands of doctors the moral question raised by abortion. As such, doctors are

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\(^{96}\) 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

\(^{97}\) Id. at 61 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164) (summarizing the Roe decision by stating “[t]he participation by the attending physician in the abortion decision, and his responsibility in that decision, thus, were emphasized.”).

\(^{98}\) 462 U.S. 416. The Supreme Court held unconstitutional several provisions of an Akron, Ohio ordinance requiring performance of all post-first trimester abortions in a hospital, parental consent, informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains. Id. at 419, 422–26.

\(^{99}\) Id. at 427 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (other citations omitted)).

\(^{100}\) Nan Hunter has argued that the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade can best be understood as the Court’s attempt to delegate to physicians the juridical authority over the procreative questions presented by abortion. Hunter, supra note 11, at 194-197; Appleton, supra note 11, at 199-200; Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1199-1200 (“The idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical judgment. The Roe decision might have been less of a storm center had it [] homed in more precisely on the women’s equality dimension of the issue.” (citations omitted)); Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion, supra note 11, at 42; TRIBE, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that the medical model, which emphasized the role of doctors in the abortion decision, reinforced the traditional role of women as dependent and not in control of their destiny); but see Law, supra note 11 at 937–38 (offering a critique of Tribe’s THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES).

\(^{101}\) Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 11 at 1897. See e.g., Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 11, at 273-79 (describing how the Roe Court suggested that “states should defer to private decisions respecting abortion because they reflect the expertise of a medical professional, not because the community owes any particular deference to women’s decisions about whether to assume the obligations of motherhood.” (citations omitted)).

\(^{102}\) See “Right to Choose Memorandum,” December 1972 by Jimmye Kimmey, in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41, at 33-34.

\(^{103}\) See Wood & Durham, supra note 22; at 783–84; Appleton, supra note 11, at 199-200 (discussing the “medical-counselor” model in which doctors actively participate in the woman’s decision-making regarding abortion).
placed in the role of expressing public morality in private decision-making in the abortion context with providers serving as the mediator between private choices and public concerns. Thus, medical judgment shields politically divisive moral choices and serves as the benign face of state regulation designed to deny access to care central to core constitutional rights without the political cost of outright repeal of the abortion right through the courts. Professor Nan Hunter has described that the Roe Court’s decision to place doctors in the role of mediating women’s decision-making was an attempt to delegate to physicians the juridical authority over the procreative questions presented by abortion.

The next section examines the critical leap the Court made in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that transformed doctors from trusted advisors to gatekeepers. It begins by examining how abortion opponents seized upon restricting abortion at the site of doctors’ sentinel role rather than seeking to overturn Roe outright. Next it considers how the Casey decision’s undue burden analysis enabled states to revise the role of doctors and turn them into quasi-state actors required to read informed consent scripts and perform forced ultrasounds on pregnant people seeking abortion.

E. Restrictions that Target the Doctor-Patient Relationship

History has revealed the extent to which the Roe Court’s decision to establish doctors as gatekeepers to the abortion right left abortion vulnerable to restricting the right at the site of the doctor-patient relationship. The Roe v. Wade decision has been consistently challenged over the last forty-eight years by a well-organized minority opposed to abortion rights. In 1985, after a series of

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105 Doctors play a similar role in the context of care that is closely tied to constitutional rights of bodily autonomy that engage significant moral and ethical questions. Bloche, supra note 104, at 397396 (arguing that medical necessity analysis to overcome the “gag rule” in Rust v. Sullivan serves as a shield for private choice about abortion).

106 Hunter, supra note 11, at 194-197 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade can be understood as the Court’s attempt to delegate to physicians the juridical authority over the procreative questions presented by abortion.). At the time the case was decided, most doctors, including obstetricians, were men so that the medical gatekeeper was a gendered construct that reinforced the role of male gatekeepers in women’s lives more generally, from husbands, to fathers, and now physicians.

108 A recent Gallup Poll found that the largest segment of people in the U.S. say that abortion should be legal under certain circumstances, which “is broadly similar to what Gallup has found in four decades of measurement.” Lydia Saad, U.S. Abortion Attitudes Stable; No Consensus on Legality, GALLUP: SOCIAL ISSUES (June 9, 2017, http://www.gallup.com/poll/211901/abortion-attitudes-stable-no-consensus-legality.aspx?g_source=ABORTION&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tile; [https://perma.cc/CC56-9Y47] (finding that the largest segment of Americans favor the middle position that abortion should be “legal only under certain circumstances” as “broadly similar to what Gallup has found in four decades of measurement.”); see also Public Opinion on Abortion: Views on Abortion, 1995-2017, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 7, 2017), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/; [https://perma.cc/X8H5-RWJQ] (finding public support for legal abortion remains

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unsuccessful challenges to Roe, then-Assistant Solicitor General Samuel Alito drafted a memorandum ("Alito Memo") that outlined a strategy to effectively repeal Roe by chipping away at abortion access through state-level restrictions that target the doctor-patient relationship.109 Realizing that it was unlikely that Roe could be overturned due to the then-current make up of the Court, the Memo offers a piecemeal strategy designed to achieve the ends sought without having to overturn the decision outright: "There may be an opportunity to nudge the Court toward . . . greater recognition of the states’ interest in protecting the unborn through pregnancy, or to dispel in part the mystical faith in the attending physician that supports Roe and the subsequent cases. I find this approach preferable to a frontal assault on Roe v. Wade."110 The Alito Memo reveals a strategy to shift focus from court challenges to state-level legislation to limit abortion rights by regulating providers and leveraging the doctor-patient relationship to achieve political rather than healthcare ends.111

State-level regulations to restrict abortion access came before the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.112 The Casey decision upheld all of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act with the exception of the spousal consent provision, including mandated 24-hour waiting periods and informed consent dialogues that required doctors to read state-mandated scripts.113 Most importantly, the Casey decision downgraded the standard of judicial review for abortion regulations from what was arguably strict scrutiny to the lower undue burden standard.114 The case held that a state may express its interest in potential life by regulating abortion, so long as those regulations do not pose an "undue burden" on a pregnant person’s ability to seek an abortion before viability.115

as high as it has been in two decades of polling, setting support at 61%); Samantha Lucks & Michael Salamone, Abortion, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 101 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008) (finding that public opinion has remained fairly stable in support of the abortion right).

109 The memo outlined a strategy to erode the abortion right through state regulations that restrict access to abortion. He relied on a series of cases that offered the opportunity to focus action at the state-level, including American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology v. Thornburgh, 737 F. 2nd 283 (3d Cir. 1984), Diamond v. Charles, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). See discussion, MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 663 (West 2015).

110 Memorandum from Samuel Alito, Assistant to the Solicitor General, to Charles Fried, Solicitor General (May 30, 1985) (excerpted in id. at 663-64. The memo describes a strategy to dispel "the mystical faith in the attending physician" and in recent years anti-abortion activists have begun to challenge whether providers have standing to sue on behalf of their patients. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2117-18 (2010) (arguing that the State had waived its argument that physicians lack standing to bring the case on behalf of their patients because the State raised the argument for the first time on cross-appeal.).

111 See id.


113 See discussion, MURRAY & LUKER, supra note 110 at 775-776 (describing that the undue burden standard replaced the earlier strict scrutiny standard and was originally proposed by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).

114 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. The undue burden standard was defined as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id. at 877. While the state may seek to ensure that a woman’s choice is informed and protect the health and safety of a woman, the state may not prohibit the woman from making the ultimate decision to undergo an abortion. Id. at 878-79.
The Casey decision encapsulates the extent to which the abortion right has become bifurcated between the rightsholder and their doctor-gatekeeper. The Casey opinion briefly addressed the significance of the constitutional right of abortion before turning to the regulation of the doctor-patient relationship in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. Describing the issue at stake in the abortion right, the opinion states:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

The Court’s description of the right at stake gestures toward the connection between pregnant people’s ability to control their reproduction and equal protection, noting, that “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” The Court notes that this is where the analysis begins—but does not end. Here, the Casey Court recalibrates the state’s interest in regulating doctors as gatekeepers in accessing abortion; the state may put in place abortion restrictions designed to express the state’s “profound respect for the life of the unborn” even if the regulations do not further a health interest.

Courts will strike on state regulations that pose an undue burden—one that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path” of a pregnant person “seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” The Casey Court describes that the doctor-patient relationship is only “derivative of the woman’s position” and specifically separates the right of abortion from the framework for regulating abortion access at the site of the doctor-patient relationship. While Roe and subsequent cases conceptualized the doctor-patient relationship as integral to the abortion right, the Casey Court cleaved the connection between the right to make the abortion decision and the doctor-patient relationship, making them two distinct concerns worthy of independent evaluation. This framing opened the possibility of what had always lay dormant: the ability of the state to restrict abortion by leveraging the role of the doctor-gatekeeper. Under the undue burden analysis, once the physician was isolated from the abortion rightsholder, their role could be

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115 See, e.g., Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 385 (2013) (finding that the abortion right is in danger of becoming a “right without a remedy.”).
116 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (citing the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989. 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990)). Note that the fifth provision, spousal consent for married women seeking abortion, was struck down by the Casey Court. Id. at 895.
117 Id. at 851.
118 Id. at 856 (citing R. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice 109, 133, n. 7 (rev. ed. 1990)).
119 Id. at 852.
120 Id. at 877.
121 Id. at 886.
122 Id. at 877.
123 Id. at 884 (noting that the doctor-patient relationship is only “derivative of the woman’s position” and “does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.”).
manipulated to achieve state ends without affecting the *decisional* right which the Court identified was distinct and separate from healthcare access.

In the wake of *Casey*, states have passed an unprecedented number of abortion regulations aimed at restricting access by imposing onerous requirements to access clinic-based care. Indeed, the five-year period from 2010–2015 accounts for more than one-quarter of all abortion restrictions passed since the Supreme Court’s *Roe v. Wade* decision in 1973.\footnote{410 U.S. 113 (1973).} More abortion restrictions were enacted in the three years from 2011–2013 than in the entire previous decade.\footnote{As of 2016, states had enacted 1,074 abortion restrictions; 288 or twenty-seven percent of these laws were enacted after 2010. This marks the most precipitous rise in anti-abortion legislation in any five-year period since *Roe*. *Last Five Years Account for More Than One-Quarter of All Abortion Restrictions Enacted Since Roe*, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/01_LAST-FIVE-YEARS-ACCOUNT-MORE-ONE-QUARTER-ALL-ABORTION-RESTRICTIONS-ENACTED-ROE. [https://perma.cc/GL5Z-LTN7].} As the Alito Memo presaged, many of the restrictions target the provider-patient relationship in an attempt to “dispel . . . the mystical faith in the attending physician that supports *Roe* and the subsequent cases.”\footnote{205 abortion restrictions were enacted from 2011–2013, while just 189 were enacted during the period 2001–2010. *More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade*, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2014/01/MORE-STATE-ABORTION-RESTRICTIONS-WERE-ENACTED-2011-2013-EFFECTIVE-DECADE. [https://perma.cc/C47D-5E2N].} By targeting the doctor-patient relationship, abortion opponents have increasingly turned doctors into quasi-state actors whose role is to carry out and enforce the state’s pro-life message through the doctor-patient relationship, even where those messages do not comport with the doctor’s own beliefs, science, or the best healthcare outcomes for their patients. These laws have been facilitated by the undue burden analysis announced in *Casey* that allows the state to insert a pro-life message into the doctor-patient relationship even where the activity does not further healthcare outcomes but merely expresses the state’s interest in fetal life.

A significant way that states have sought to restrict access through doctors’ gatekeeper roles is through imposing onerous informed consent requirements. To date, eighteen states have enacted abortion-related informed consent legislation, in five of the states, doctors are compelled to inform people seeking abortion of the link between abortion and cancer, fetal pain disclosures are required in thirteen states, and information about long-term mental health effects of abortion are required in eight states.\footnote{Memorandum From Samuel Alito, Assistant to the Solicitor General, to Charles Fried, Solicitor General 17 (May 30, 2008).} In many states with these types of informed consent requirements, physicians have sought to comply with its terms by reading the consent provisions aloud to patients, thus becoming a “script” that physicians must read. Doctors are required to read these scripts even when it does not accurately comport with their views and even where the information contained in the script is known to be scientifically or medically inaccurate.\footnote{See Murray & Luker, supra note 110, at 806; Zita Lazzarini, *South Dakota’s Abortion Script—Threatening the Physician-Patient Relationship*, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008) (“By requiring physicians to deliver such misinformation and discouraging them from providing alternative accurate information, the [South Dakota] statute forces physicians to violate their obligation to solicit truly informed consent . . . .”); Maya Manian, *Perverting Informed Consent: The South Dakota Court Decision*, RH REALITY CHECK (Aug. 1, 2012), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/08/01/PERVERTING-INFORMED-CONSENT.} Requiring providers to read scripts not only raises significant

First Amendment concerns, but it also degrades the provider-patient relationship by requiring doctors to become the mouthpiece of the State and to provide their patients with information about abortion that is not supported by scientific research. By requiring physicians to deliver misinformation, the state forces providers to violate their obligation to their patients to obtain informed consent and erodes trust between patients and their physicians.

Another way states have restricted abortion access by targeting providers’ role as gatekeepers by imposing mandatory and clinically unnecessary ultrasounds. For example, Oklahoma requires that a medical provider must perform an ultrasound before performing any abortion procedure and must “[d]isplay the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them” and provide a description of what the ultrasound image depicts. These ultrasounds are fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of informed consent which provides that doctors must give patients objective and neutral information so that patients can make autonomous decisions about their medical treatment. Mandatory ultrasounds also significantly increase the cost of the abortion procedure. Finally, requiring that a patient undergo an unwanted and medically unnecessary ultrasound at the behest of the


The underlying value that animates informed consent is the legal recognition of the medical patient’s right of autonomous decision making. Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 420 (1979) (describing that the purpose of requiring patient consent to treatment is to preserve and protect his “physical and psychic integrity against unwanted invasions, and to permit the patient to act as an autonomous, self-determining human being”).

See Lazzarini, supra note 131., at 2191.

See id.; Manian, Perverting Informed Consent, supra note 131.

See Manian, Perverting Informed Consent, supra note 131.


legislature intrudes upon the doctor-patient relationship and mandates that doctors violate a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment.139

States have sought to regulate the provider-patient relationship to restrict abortion through waiting periods, some as high as 72 hours.140 Funding restrictions in the federal Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds to be used for abortions,120a and similar state-level funding restrictions,120b have severely limited access to abortion for people living in poverty and those who rely on public health programs, such as those who serve in the military.141 Finally, a new wave of so-called “heartbeat” bills prohibit abortion as soon as a fetal heartbeat can be detected, which happens at about six weeks into pregnancy, often before many people realize they are pregnant.142

The Trump administration expanded “conscience rules” to protect health care workers who oppose abortion, sterilization, physician assisted dying, and other medical procedures on religious or moral grounds.143 The rule established guidelines for punishing health care institutions with loss of federal funding for failure to respect the rights of workers who assert religious or moral objections to providing care.144 Finally, the Trump administration reintroduced the “domestic gag rule,” since rescinded by President Biden in his first two weeks in office, which prohibited providers who receive

139 Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (April 1, 2019). 26 states regulate the provision of an ultrasound before an abortion may be performed. Of these, four require the physician to show the and describe the image. Eight others require the physician offer the pregnant person the opportunity to view the image. Id.

118a Manian, Perverting Informed Consent, supra note 131 (“[M]andatory ultrasounds impose a medical procedure in violation of a patient’s right to refuse treatment protected by informed consent law.”).

140 See Abortion Waiting Period Requirements, CNTR. PUB. HEALTH L. RESEARCH (March 1, 2021), http://publichealthlawresearch.org/product/abortion-waiting-period-requirements [https://perma.cc/7D3P-9FT6] (documenting state abortion waiting period laws, which generally require a waiting period between 24 and 72 hours).).


143 See Sarah Mervosh, Georgia Is Latest State to Pass Fetal Heartbeat Bill as Part of Growing Trend, N.Y. TIMES. (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/georgia-fetal-heartbeat-abortion-law.html [https://perma.cc/JW4P-EJSN] (describing the growing momentum for these bills, including recent versions signed into law in Mississippi and Kentucky, and similar bills expected to follow in Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas). Fetal heartbeat bills in Iowa, Kentucky, and North Dakota have been halted in the courts. Id.


federal funding from counseling patients about abortion, even when an abortion is medically indicated in a provider’s medical judgment.\textsuperscript{145}

States have also passed laws to restrict abortion that do not restrict the abortion services themselves but regulate facilities and the doctors who perform abortions, known as TRAP laws (Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers).\textsuperscript{146} TRAP laws in various states have imposed burdensome record keeping and reporting requirements, and have required that doctors who perform abortions have admitting privileges at local hospitals, a virtual impossibility in states hostile to abortion. TRAP laws also include regulations that impose building requirements for physical facilities that provide abortion—such as width of hallways, equipment—that are not required of other ambulatory surgical centers.\textsuperscript{147} These onerous TRAP laws have effectively achieved their intended goal of reducing the number of abortion providers, and increasing both cost and distance to reach providers.\textsuperscript{148}

TRAP laws came before the Supreme Court in 2015 in \textit{Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.}\textsuperscript{149} In that case, the Court considered a Texas law, H.B. 2, that required abortion providers to secure admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and required that abortion clinics meet the requirements of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1} Pam Belluck, \textit{Trump Administration Blocks Funds for Planned Parenthood and Others over Abortion Referrals}, \textit{N.Y. TIMES} (Feb. 22, 2019) 22, 2019), \url{https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/health/trump-defunds-planned-parenthood.html} [https://perma.cc/RP5W-8BWD]. In his first two weeks in office, President Biden rescinded the global gag rule, the so-called “Mexico City Policy.” While the global gag rule can be rescinded by executive order, the domestic gag rule requires a regulatory process that is currently underway. Steve Benen, \textit{Why Biden Reversing the Anti-Abortion “Gag Rule” Matters}, MSNBC (Jan. 29, 2021), \url{https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-madow-show/why-biden-reversing-anti-abortion-gag-rule-matters-n1256157} [https://perma.cc/3UVP-P96Z].

\bibitem{2} \textit{See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers}, GUTTMACHER INST. (April 1, 2019), \url{https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers} [https://perma.cc/CJL2-E5J]; (describing regulations specific to abortion providers in various states). “Abortion exceptionalism” is a term that has been used to describe the tendency of legislatures and courts to subject abortion to uniquely burdensome rules that are not imposed on other healthcare providers who perform procedures with greater risk of injury and death to patients than the abortion procedure. Ian Vanderwalker, \textit{Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics}, 19 MIC. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012).

\url{http://reproductiverights.org/sites/err.civactions.net/files/documents/pub_hp_avoideventingthetrap.pdf}

\bibitem{3} \textit{See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP)}, CNTR. REPORD. RIGHTS (Aug. 28, 2015) (describing burdens imposed by TRAP laws); \textit{Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt}, 579 U.S. __ , 135 S.Ct. 2292, 2314–2315 (2016) (describing burdens imposed by Texas’s TRAP law). In \textit{Whole Woman’s Health}, the Court found that health care claims asserted in the Texas law were called into question when the state did not similarly regulate more dangerous procedures such as colonoscopy, liposuction, and childbirth. 136 Sup. Ct. at 2315 Indeed, in her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg stated that, “[g]iven those realities, it is beyond rational belief that [the Texas law] could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law ‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’” \textit{Id.} at 2321 ( quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)). As one court has described, “first trimester abortions are less likely to result in complications than many other surgical procedures that are routinely performed in doctor’s offices.” Tenn. Dept’ of Health v. Boyle, No. M2001-01738-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31840685, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002).


\bibitem{5} 136 S. Ct. 2292.

\end{thebibliography}
ambulatory surgical centers. In *Whole Woman’s Health*, the Court clarified the undue burden standard by requiring that a state offer an evidentiary basis to substantiate its claim that that abortion restrictions protected women’s health. Under the new analysis, it is the role of the courts to interrogate the veracity of healthcare claims underlying abortion restrictions. Next, the courts must balance the purported health benefits of an abortion regulation against the burdens placed upon women’s access to abortion-related healthcare. The Court found a “virtual absence of any health benefit” from the Texas law and detailed the law’s detrimental effect on pregnant people’s access to abortion-related healthcare. The decision in *Whole Woman’s Health* reasserts that patients and patient access to services are a central concern when reviewing restrictive abortion legislation under the undue burden analysis. The Court noted that Texas’ restrictive abortion regulation HB2 that required doctors have admitting privileges and that abortion clinics meet the rigorous standards of ambulatory surgical centers, had shuttered most of the state’s abortion clinics and as a result, “[p]atients seeking these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered.” As *June Medical Services* case—which came on the heels of *Whole Woman’s Health* just three years earlier—reveals, the TRAP strategy has resulted in an ongoing barrage of cases that seek to erode the abortion right at the point of access to clinic-based medical care rather than overturn *Roe* outright. The *June Medical* decision also calls into question whether the balancing approach in *Whole Woman’s Health* and its renewed focus on patients in the undue burden analysis will hold. Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in *June Medical* rejected the balancing test set forth in *Whole Woman’s Health* and retreated to the undue burden analysis of the *Casey* decision which merely required courts to

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150 See id. at 2310, 2314 (describing the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center requirements).
151 Id. at 2310.
152 Id. at 2309 (stating that the “rule announced in *Casey* . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”).
153 Id. at 2313.
154 Id. at 2312–2313. *June Medical Services v. Russo*, ___ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) involved a nearly identical admitting privileges law, this time out of Louisiana, and came just three years after *Whole Woman’s Health*, but with two new Trump-appointed members on the Court. Nonetheless the Court found that Louisiana law unconstitutional. Id. at 2113.
157 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Many commentators have observed that the *June Medical* decision was not as much a victory as many have suggested. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Opinion: The Supreme Court’s Abortion Decision Seems Pulled from the ‘Casey’ Playbook, WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/problem-with-relying-precedent-protect-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/9RP7-TZQC] (describing that Justice Roberts signed on to the majority out of respect for stare decisis but critically rejected reasoning of *Whole Woman’s Health* that required courts to weigh whether an abortion law’s purported benefits exceeded the burdens imposed and retreated to the *Casey* standard whether the law places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.); Mary Ziegler, Op-Ed: Why Abortion Rights Are Still at Risk, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2020) (noting that Justice Roberts’ decision was not based on a “newfound commitment” to the abortion right but simply his commitment to stare decisis). For a discussion of stare decisis in *June Medical*, see Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308, 319–327 (2020).

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consider whether a restriction placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a person seeking an abortion.\textsuperscript{158}

An unprecedented number of abortion restrictions regulate abortion at the point of access and have significantly degraded the quality of the provider-patient relationship. These laws serve to reduce the trust and confidence central to the doctor-patient relationship as doctors are turned from trusted consultants to vehicles of state regulation. What is more, the Court’s own language suggests that it has come to view doctors, once trusted advisors in Roe, as trying to trick unsuspecting women.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, legislatures and the courts alike have cleaved the doctor-patient relationship. They have put in place obstacles to abortion-related healthcare access, set doctors in opposition to patients, and made doctors the mouthpiece of the state in scripts and mandatory ultrasounds.

F. Medication Abortion: Eliminating the Need for Doctors

In 2000, the FDA approved the use of medication abortion, a non-surgical two-drug protocol—mifepristone and misoprostol—for safely and effectively terminating pregnancy up to eleven weeks gestation.\textsuperscript{160} Because this method does not involve surgery, a pregnant person may end a pregnancy at home using medication abortion under two circumstances: within the clinical context facilitated by a provider or outside of the clinical context by self-inducing abortion.\textsuperscript{161} The two-drug medication abortion regimen is used by hundreds of thousands of women in the United States.\textsuperscript{162} The

\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 2135–36 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that “[n]othing about Casey suggested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”).

\textsuperscript{159} For example, in marked contrast to earlier case law that viewed physicians as trusted advisors in the abortion relationship, the Court suggested in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) that providers might intentionally seek to withhold information about the details of the abortion procedure from their female patients. The Court then wrote that “[i]t is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice . . . to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child ., a child assuming the human form.” Id. at 159–160).

\textsuperscript{160} Mifepris \textit{t}one Information, \textit{F}ood \textit{A}ND \textit{D}RUG \textit{A}DMINISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-and-providers/mifepris-tone-information [https://perma.cc/X5UZ-ZZKK]. Since FDA approval, medication abortion has been used by almost two million women in the United States to end early pregnancies, about 200,000 a year. Linda Greenhouse, \textit{The Next Abortion Case is Here}, N.Y. \textit{A}TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/the-next-abortion-case-is-here/ [https://perma.cc/86PU-KPKL].

\textsuperscript{161} Medication abortion involves the use of medication rather than surgery to induce an abortion. Self-managed abortion is discussed in Section III.

\textsuperscript{162} Medication abortion accounted for 39 percent of all abortions in the U.S. in 2017. The number of medication abortions performed in nonhospital facilities also increased by 25 percent 2014 since 2014. Jones, Witwer, & Jerman, \textit{supra} note 128. While protecting direct-access medication abortion will protect access for people seeking the procedure in the first trimester, it is important to note that it is not a panacea because it still leaves later term abortions unprotected. While approximately ninety-two percent of abortions are within the first thirteen weeks gestation, CDC Abortion \textit{S}urveillance \textit{S}ystem \textit{F}-\textit{AQ}s, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm, later term abortions are necessary healthcare. The need for later term abortions often result from delays due to barriers to accessing the procedure, including raising the necessary funds to pay for an abortion, and from discovery of fetal anomaly or maternal health concerns later in the pregnancy. Diana Greene Foster, \textit{Who Seeks Abortion at or After 20 Weeks}, PERSP. REP. \textit{H}EALTH (Sep. 5, 2019) (describing that later term abortions were frequently due to logistical delays such as difficulty finding a provider or raising necessary funds for the procedure or travel costs), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24188634/.

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FDA protocol requires that the first medication, mifepristone, be dispensed in-person at a clinic, but does not indicate where either of the two drugs must be ingested. In most of the world self-administration has become the standard of care. Telemedicine—virtual consultation with a physician by video—has been an effective way to provide abortion-related healthcare to pregnant people in remote areas. When telemedicine is used in a clinical setting, a doctor talks with patients on-screen, reviews test results, and then the doctor dispenses the dosage of the pills by remotely opening a drawer containing the pills. The pills are dispensed in the clinic and the patient takes the first pill, mifepristone, with the doctor watching over video and the second pill, misoprostol, at home. A current study underway by Gynuity Health Projects under a Investigational New Drug Approval study is studying the effectiveness of providing abortion medication by mail using telemedicine, thereby entirely foregoing the need for a clinic visit. The first set of results published three years after the start of their clinical trial concluded that in-home administration of medication abortion obtained through the mail was as safe and effective and as acceptable to pregnant people as clinic administration. Similarly, a study of the effectiveness and acceptability of medication abortion with both drugs dispensed by a pharmacy rather than in-person dispensing protocol, found that pharmacy dispensing of both pills, mifepristone and misoprostol, to be safe and effective and acceptable to patients.

Medication abortion is successful in about 95 percent of cases. The FDA has found that mifepristone “has been increasingly used as its efficacy and safety have become well established by both research and experience, and serious complications have proven to be extremely rare.” The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has determined that pregnant people can “safely and effectively” use telemedicine to have medication abortion at home. An analysis of

163 Mifepristone must be dispensed by a certified healthcare provider under the FDA's Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy. See Mifeprisone (mifepristone) Information, supra note 136.

164 Mitchell D. Creinin & Kristina Gemsell Danielsson, Medical Abortion in early pregnancy, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED AND ABNORMAL PREGNANCY: COMPREHENSIVE ABORTION CARE 114 (Maureen Paul et al. eds., 2009).


166 Id.

167 Id.

168 After consulting with an abortion provider by videoconference, the patient is sent the necessary abortion medication by mail. See TELABORTION, http://telaboration.org/ [https://perma.cc/2DBT-LSE4].


175 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, PRACTICE BULLETIN: MEDICATION ABORTION UP TO 70 DAYS OF GESTATION c35 (2020).
pooled data from nine studies conducted by WHO found home-based medication abortions to be as effective as those administered in clinics, noting that “past research has established home-based medication abortions may have several advantages over clinic-based protocols, including allowing for greater privacy and lessening the burden on both women and service providers by reducing the number of clinic visits.”

Despite the proven safety and efficacy of at-home administration of the two-drug regimen of medication abortion under a doctor’s supervision, abortion opponents have sought to restrict medication abortion through telemedicine by requiring that a patient be in the physical presence of a doctor when taking medication abortion. Republican senators introduced a bill in 2020 to ban abortion by telemedicine, and nineteen states have passed laws effectively banning abortion by telemedicine by requiring that the two-drug regimen for medication abortion be taken in the physical presence of a doctor while on site at a clinic, despite the fact that guidelines by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) do not require that either of the pills be ingested in-person at a clinic or provider’s office. In states with an in-person doctor requirement, a pregnant person may have to travel long distances to visit a clinic, and attend in-person counseling or undergo enforced ultrasound examinations that necessitate multiple trips to the clinic.

The FDA has suspended the in-person dispensing requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic, however state laws in the nineteen states that require in-person dispensing will remain in effect and the in-person dispensing requirement for mifepristone will come back into effect at the end of the pandemic unless there is further FDA action to remove the REMS for mifepristone. These in-person requirements—for both dispensing and ingesting medication abortion—pose unnecessary risk to both patients and providers during the global COVID-19 pandemic, and those

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176 Medication Abortion May Be Equally Safe Whether Done at Home or Clinic, 37 INT’L PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 160-161 (2011); T.D. Ngo, Comparative Effectiveness, Safety, and Acceptability of Medical Abortion at Home and in a Clinic: A Systemic Review, 89(5) BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 360-370 (2011). In light of its safety and efficacy, some researchers are calling for misoprostol alone to be available over-the-counter and have suggested calling it “Plan C” in reference to the morning-after pill, RU486, that is sold under the name “Plan B.” Francine Coeytaux & Victoria Nichols, Plan C: The Safe Strategy for a Missed Period When You Don’t Want to Be Pregnant, REWIRE (Feb. 7, 2014), https://rewirenensgroup.com/article/2014/02/07/plan-c-safe-strategy-missed-period-dont-want-pregnant [https://perma.cc/BQW2-BCZ9].


179 The new FDA guidelines require that the first drug, mifepristone, be “dispensed” by a doctor but does not require that the pills be ingested in the presence of a doctor. Because the guidelines do not require that either drug, mifepristone or misoprostol, be taken in the presence of a doctor, they can be taken at home. See Mifeprisone (mifepristone) Information, supra note 136.

180 See PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 150, at e35.;


183 See discussion, Donley, supra note 169 at n. 434 and accompanying text (noting that even if the mifepristone REMS is released under the Biden administration, in-person dispensing would still be required by state law in the nineteen states that require in-person dispensing by a physician.).
When Patients Are Their Own Doctors

April 2021

risks fall disproportionately upon communities of color. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in FDA v. ACOG describes that “more than half of women who have abortions are women of color, and COVID-19’s mortality rate is three times higher for Black and Hispanic individuals than non-Hispanic White individuals. On top of that, three-quarters of abortion patients have low incomes, making them more likely to rely on public transportation to get to a clinic to pick up their medication.” Long travel distances to clinics with limited operating hours during the pandemic increases the risk of exposure to the virus not only for the patients seeking abortions, but also for their families because, as Justice Sotomayor points out, “minority and low-income populations are more likely to live in intergenerational housing, so patients risk infecting not just themselves but also elderly parents and grandparents.”

Abortion opponents have seized upon the medical gatekeeper model to both make it more difficult to access clinic-based care and at the same time unnecessarily require patients to be physically present in clinics. Against this backdrop, the next section describes the cultural and technological shifts that have transformed the landscape of healthcare generally and abortion specifically to render the gatekeeper model obsolete. In the face of barriers to access, significant numbers of people are turning to self-managed abortion with medication abortion pills procured online. Self-managed abortion reveals the degree to which the antiquated gatekeeper model has been rendered obsolete in the face of technology not contemplated at the time of the Roe decision.

II. The Rise of Self-Managed Care and the Fallacy of the Gatekeeper Model

The Supreme Court’s gatekeeper model, first laid out in Roe and entrenched in both abortion jurisprudence and state law over the last forty-eight years, no longer comports with the realities of abortion practice and indeed never reflected the lived experiences of individuals living in poverty, who are disproportionately of color, and frequently lack access to adequate healthcare generally, and abortion care specifically. This section considers the antiquated gatekeeper model in light of the revolution in patient autonomy ushered in by the Patient’s Bill of Rights and the rise of empowered patient consumers in the direct-to-consumer medical marketplace. Finally, the section examines self-managed abortion, that is, abortion that takes place outside of the clinical setting through medication procured online directly by consumers without the assistance of a physician. It describes the evidence that significant numbers of pregnant people are turning to self-managed abortion, especially when faced with barriers to access to clinic-based abortion.

185 See infra text accompanying notes 329–327.
186 FDA v. ACOG, 141 S. Ct. at 582.
187 Id.
188 While the Court may not have contemplated self-managed care in Roe, to be sure, pregnant people have been self-managing abortion throughout history. There are historical accounts of home abortion dating back at least two thousand years. Luker, supra note 24, at 11-12. In colonial America and the early days of the republic, people seeking to terminate a pregnancy or “bring on delayed menses” turned to herbalists, midwives, and “Indian doctors” for herbal remedies. Murray & Luker, supra note 110 at 627-28.
A. Longstanding Holes in the Gatekeeper Model

The Roe Court’s idealized description of a doctor who counseled his passive and trusting patient on the abortion decision was never an accurate depiction of abortion for any but the most privileged patients who were able to access a private physician and who delegated decision-making authority to that doctor. As the statistics described earlier revealed, people living in poverty and people of color giving birth in the public maternity wards were unable to access abortion and people of color and living in poverty were disproportionately dying of illegal abortion due to their lack of access to clinic-based abortion. 189 What is more, the idealized medical gatekeeper was also not a reality in abortion care in the period even after Roe. In the years after Roe, abortion rights activists worked quickly to establish stand-alone abortion clinics as the cheapest and most effective strategy to rapidly expand abortion access.190 Abortion-related medical care was isolated from general medical practice and isolated in stand-alone clinics.191 After 1973 the medical profession failed to make a concerted effort to train doctors to do abortions and to encourage doctors to integrate abortion into ordinary practice.192 As a result, over the last forty-eight years abortion training has been steadily disappearing from residency programs that produce new doctors and abortion care has been almost exclusively performed in stand-alone clinics.193 In 1973 hospitals made up eighty percent of the country’s abortion facilities and by 1996 ninety percent of the abortions in the U.S. were performed at clinics.194

Because abortion clinics are isolated from ordinary healthcare practice, most people who terminate their pregnancies do so at stand-alone clinics and necessarily do not have an existing doctor-patient relationship like the one described by the Roe Court. As Professor Nan Hunter has argued, once abortion opponents realized that doctors could not be trusted to impose conservative mores and that the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship was a space in which women and doctors could make decisions that resisted traditional norms, abortion opponents sought to reinsert the state into

189 See supra text accompanying notes 55–70.
190 See, e.g., Rachel K. Jones, Mia R. S. Solna, Stanley K. Henshaw, & Lawrence B. Finer, Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 14 (2008) (noting that for many freestanding clinics, the “larger the caseload, the less charged for the procedure”); Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 18 (2003) (finding that by 2001, the mean charge for an abortion at 10 weeks since a woman’s last menstrual period at an abortion clinic was $364 compared to $426 at a non-specialized clinic and $632 at a physician’s office); Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 23 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 249 (1991) (finding that large facilities achieve “economies of scale” by providing a large number of abortions).
191 See Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES (July 1814, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortion-t.html [https://perma.cc/GM3K-H74S]; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Finances and Fear Spurring Hospitals to Drop Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1995) (stating in 1995 that “almost of New York City’s full-service hospitals have backed out of the abortion business, driven away in part by economics and in part by fear” and reporting that, by 1988, only 16 percent of abortions in New York were performed in hospitals and, by 1993, only 9 percent).
192 Id. See Bazelon, supra note 163 (“The American Medical Association did not maintain standards of care for the procedure . . . Being a pro-choice doctor came to mean referring your patients to a clinic rather than doing abortions in your own office.”).
193 Id. (“In 1995, the number of OB-GYN residencies offering abortion training fell to a low of 12 percent.”).
194 Id.
the doctor-patient relationship. Abortion opponents have taken aim at stand-alone clinics, describing them as “abortion mills” and seeking to undermine the legitimacy of abortion providers.

In the intervening years since the Roe decision, abortion restrictions have had a disproportionate impact on the poorest and most vulnerable, who are disproportionately people of color. Lack of health insurance coverage for abortion-related healthcare and lack of resources to pay out of pocket for clinic-based care means that people living in poverty have less access to abortion. Waiting periods require people seeking abortion to make two trips to clinics, which is a greater challenge to low-income and hourly workers who have less flexibility in their work schedules and must take time off from work. Long travel to reach a provider, especially when combined with waiting periods, means that people seeking abortion must stay overnight, arrange work schedules, and arrange for childcare if they are already parenting. People living in rural areas are even more likely to have to travel long distances to reach providers as ninety-seven percent of rural counties do not have a single abortion provider. Pregnant people with compromised immigration status face greater obstacles to accessing abortion care because their ability to travel long distances to obtain reproductive healthcare is limited by the threat of apprehension, detention, and deportation, which severely restricts their travel and movement. It is often these very barriers to access to physicians, the proliferation of regulation of abortion at the site of access, and significant harassment at abortion clinics have driven people to turn to self-managed care.

The “responsible physician” central to the Roe Court’s vision of the abortion right has not only become obsolete, but in many states has become an obstacle to abortion access, especially for those who are most vulnerable and marginalized. As described earlier, anti-abortion tactics have focused on the doctor-patient relationship—from requiring that a doctor be physically present when

195 Hunter, supra note 11, at 196.
16a Karissa Haugeberg, Women Against Abortion: Inside the Largest Moral Reform Movement of the Twentieth Century 78, 138 (U. Ill. Press. 2017) (describing anti-abortion protesters using the term “abortion mill”); Sanger, supra note 155 at 36 (describing that the “pro-life movement has long characterized abortion clinics as “mills” that run women through for profit alone.”).
196 See Bridges & Roberts RJ Scholars Brief, supra note 12, at 9–11 (arguing that a Louisiana admitting privileges law disproportionately burdens “a vulnerable group of marginalized women—black women”).
199 See, e.g., Grossman supra note 11 at 4 (finding that in Texas, self-induced abortion appeared to be more common among women who report[ed] barriers accessing reproductive health services.”); Patel v. Indiana at 22–28 (Case No. 71A04-1504-CR-00166); Brief of Amici Curiae National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum and Center for Reproductive Rights and Justice at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law et al. (hereinafter “Patel Amicus Brief”) 10–19 (describing the “myriad” of legal restrictions and practical barriers that may drive a pregnant person toward self-managed abortion, including travel distance, waiting periods, and cost of clinic based care.)

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administering abortion medication, to forced ultrasounds, waiting periods, consent scripts, and TRAP laws. These laws reveal that the anti-abortion strategy reflected in the Alito memo has reduced the role of the responsible physician in many states from a trusted adviser to an unwilling anti-abortion mouthpiece of the state. While the anti-abortion strategy that targets the doctor-patient relationship has played out, however, technology has given rise to a fundamental change in self-managed care and direct-to-consumer healthcare access that upends the strategy and calls for a new framing of the abortion right.

B. Patients as Consumers in the Direct-to-Consumer Medical Marketplace

Over the last fifty years patients have been transformed from passive recipients of doctors’ orders to actively engaged consumers who manage and direct their own healthcare. The transformation grew out of the “rights revolution” era of the 1970’s and led to the Patient’s Bill of Rights in 1973 that required doctors give patients complete and accurate information so that patients may make their own healthcare decisions in order to give informed consent. During this period, the patients’ rights movement overlapped with the feminist movement’s call for greater agency for women in healthcare decisions and the critique of women’s treatment at the hands of the patriarchal medical establishment. Indeed, one of the first patients’ rights successes was the battle for direct-to-patient labeling of prescription birth control pills and estrogen replacement therapy.

Researchers and policymakers such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have embraced the potential of increased consumer autonomy and self-managed care in order to enhance patient autonomy, increase quality, and decrease the cost of healthcare. In an era of rising costs, increasing demand, an aging population, and chronic illness, researchers and policymakers have suggested that self-managed health interventions delivered through online platforms can effectively

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201 Id. at 638637.
204 See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care? 35 AM. J. L. MED. 7 (2009); John E. Calfee, et al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Demand for Cholesterol-Reducing Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON. 673, 673-75 (2002) (describing the FDA’s 1997 policy change to allow direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising, describing that the change enhanced consumer education about health conditions and their treatments. Id. at 674. In addition, the FDA accelerated the pace of switching prescription drugs to over-the-counter to recognition of the greater role that consumers were taking in their healthcare decision.” Id. at 674-675).
205 More of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) goes to health care (16%) than in any comparable country but without any indication that the healthcare delivered is better by any measure and healthcare costs are rising faster than inflation. Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care? 35 AM. J. L. MED. 7, 8 (2009).
206 Harald Schmidt, Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: CASES SPANNING THE GLOBE 137 (2016) (reporting that treatment of chronic disease accounts for an estimated three quarters of U.S. health care spending

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address these issues. Proponents of participatory or direct-to-consumer medicine argue that the new model increases patient autonomy while also reducing costs to both individuals and the healthcare system as a whole. In response, Medicare and FDA policy have shifted to meet the expansion of patient autonomy and healthcare self-management. For example, Medicare is now taking steps to make it easier for people to do their own kidney dialysis at home. Not only does at-home use save money, but federal Medicare authorities as well as doctors recognize that patients do better when they are active participants in their own care while at the same time improving patient’s experience and lowering medical costs. In approving direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing the FDA noted “that consumers are increasingly interested in genetic information to help make decisions about their healthcare.” In more recent years, the transformation has been furthered by drug manufacturers directly advertising to consumers and shifts in FDA policies requiring patient labeling in drugs. Consumer activism has also shaped FDA policy by accelerating the movement of drugs from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) availability, which has been described as a “tidal shift of authority away from the medical profession and toward the consumer.” The movement of drugs to OTC availability, especially drugs such as the emergency contraception drug Plan B, has come in response to what the FDA has described as “a growing desire by consumers to have greater control over their health care” and the “self-care movement.”

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207 See, e.g. Mary A.M. Rogers, Kelsey Lemmen, Rachel Kramer, Jason Mann, & Vineet Chopra., Internet-Delivered Health Interventions That Work: Systematic Review of Meta-Analyses and Evaluation of Website Availability, 19 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e90 (2017) (noting that because of easy access and low cost, internet-delivered therapies are a good alternative to improving health in the face of rising cost and demand); Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The FA’s Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 DePAUL L. REV. 343, 363–364 (2019) (observing that the medical establishment’s resistance to providing medical information directly to consumers may be driven by a desire to preserve its own authority and revenue streams and may result in inefficiency and expense)(citing STEPHAN LANDSMAN & MICHAEL J. SAKS, CLOSING DEATH’S DOOR: LEGAL INNOVATIONS TO STEM THE EPIDEMIC OF HEALTHCARE HARM (2020)).

208 Sharkey, supra note 178, at 364 (“Proponents of the libertarian model tout its potential to promote preventative and individualized medicine, while simultaneously reducing costs to individuals and the health care system.”); Rogers, Lemmen, Kramer, Mann, & Chopra, supra note 204 (“Therapies that are Internet-based offer an attractive option for certain types of conditions due to easy access and low cost.”).


210 Sharkey, supra note 178, at 357 (citing Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes First Direct-to-Consumer Test for Detecting Genetic Variants That May Be Associated with Medication Metabolism (Oct. 31, 2018)).

211 While never expressly prohibited by FDA regulations, the practice did not start until the mid-1980s, after comments by FDA Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes Jr. to the Pharmaceutical Advertising Council in which he predicted “exponential growth” in DTC advertising of drugs. See Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 492–493 (1999)). The practice surged again in 1997 when FDA issued draft guidance allowing television advertising of prescription drugs for the first time. Id. at 496–498. (Aug. 12, 1997) (outlining the requirements for consumer-directed broadcast advertising of prescription drugs).


213 Id. at 662663.

214 Id. at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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In the new healthcare marketplace, individuals seeking health care exercise greater autonomy and look and act more like consumers than patients. 215 While early struggles were geared toward labeling of prescription drug information for consumers, technology has accelerated the ability of patient-consumers to directly access healthcare information and personal healthcare data and thereby assess their own health conditions and address potential problems. 216 A Pew survey published in 2013 found that thirty-five percent of U.S. adults reported using the internet at one time or another to try to diagnose a medical condition. 217 In recent years technology has accelerated the shift towards greater patient autonomy and self-managed healthcare by increasing the availability of direct-to-consumer healthcare devices and digital and mobile health products. The electrocardiogram (ECG) software application on the Apple Watch can detect atrial fibrillation and other arrhythmias. 218 The transformation of patients into autonomous consumers capable of caring for their own health is also reflected in the availability of OTC diagnostic devices, including home testing for blood pressure, cholesterol, blood glucose levels, and HIV. 219 Individuals seeking assisted reproductive technology (ART) can shop for and purchase sperm and ova directly in the online marketplace. 220 Individuals can now directly order fecal and blood testing online without a doctor acting as intermediary to write an order. Similarly, while genetic testing had been the sole purview of doctors for the last fifty years, the rise of DTC genetic testing such as 23andMe have allowed individuals to bypass doctors to obtain genetic testing directly in the marketplace. 221 Consumers have used these DTC tests for a wide range of uses, from discovering ancestry, to screening for diseases like cancer, to diagnosis and screening for drug responses. 222 Thus, healthcare trends and technology such as direct to consumer medical devices, testing, Web solutions, and mobile apps have increased patient autonomy and self-management of one’s own healthcare outside of doctors acting in the role of medical intermediaries.

While it is clear that patients in the traditional clinical context are acting more like consumers to directly manage their own healthcare through online technology, significant evidence has revealed

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215 See Grossman, supra note 171, at 627 (stating that the “FDA’s role as a paternalistic gatekeeper” has diminished and that “today’s consumers of food and drugs have far greater freedom to make unmediated choices among a wider variety of products”); Nancy Tomes, Patients or Health-Care Consumers? Why the History of Contested Terms Matters, in HISTORY AND HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: PUTTING THE PAST BACK IN 83, 1010 (Rosemary A. Stevens et al. eds. 2006).
216 See Sharkey, supra note 178, at 365 n.86.
217 Susannah Fox & Maeve Duggan, Health Online 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan 15, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/PIP_HealthOnline.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2L8T-XL3H]. The rise of WebMD, launched in 1998, exemplifies the importance of the internet. Within ten years of its launch, WebMD had forty million unique users visitors each month. Grossman, supra note 171, at 639640. It is worth noting that even before the internet, the increase in healthcare information directed to consumers began in 1970s and 80s with publications such as The Pill Book and the American Medical Association Family Medical Guide. Id. at 639–640. The latter was published “with the stated goal of ‘creating an effective partnership with your doctor.’” Id. at 640.
218 Nathan Cortez, Digital Health and Regulatory Experimentation at the FDA, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 4, 9 (2019). The FDA now applies post-rather than pre-market scrutiny to such devices in order to allow new and emerging technology to reach the market without being bogged down in regulatory quagmire. See id. at 6.
220 See Maya Sabatello, Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal, and Societal Implications, 4 LAWS 352, 354 (2015) (noting that the U.S. is unique among all other nations in that ART is a private commercial activity that is almost entirely unregulated but rather is driven by consumer demand).
221 See Sharkey, supra note 178, at 349–358 (discussing 23andMe).
222 See id. at 346 n.6. In March of 2018 the FDA authorized the first DTC cancer health risk test for breast cancer, although the Acting Director cautioned that the test should not be used as a substitute for seeing a doctor. Id. at 356–357.

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that individuals are obtaining medication directly online outside of the clinical context to self-manage a range of healthcare issues, including gender-affirming hormone therapy and abortion. In response to barriers facing transgender and gender nonconforming (TGNC) people who seek transition-related care, many transgender individuals are turning to self-managed hormone therapy. Recent studies indicate that TGNC people are obtaining hormones from non-traditional sources such as friends, street vendors, online, and through pharmacies without a prescribing physician. These studies indicate that “unsupervised hormone use reportedly ranges from 29 [percent] to 63 [percent] within urban groups of male-to-female” TGNC people. These studies report that the reasons for turning to self-managed hormone use include lack of insurance, cost of accessing health care, stigma, and difficulty finding sensitive and compassionate medical care providers.

C. Self-Managed Medication Abortion

As described earlier, doctors and medical providers widely use the two-drug medication abortion regimen of misoprostol and mifepristone in the clinical context when providing abortion care up to eleven weeks gestation. However, when pregnant people end their own pregnancies using medication without medical supervision, they generally take misoprostol alone because the FDA has required that mifepristone only be provided in-person by a clinic or provider, thereby preventing distribution through pharmacies and the mail. Gynuity Health Projects has developed a sample protocol for no-test medical abortion and the WHO recognizes use of misoprostol alone for first-trimester abortion and abortions that occur after 12 to 14 weeks of gestational age. This single

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223 Transgender and gender nonconforming people are individuals whose gender identity does not align with their biological sex at birth. While the term “transgender and gender nonconforming” is widely used, it is important to recognize that some TGNC people do not prefer these terms. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 835 (recognizing that “[a] nonbinary understanding of gender is fundamental to provision of affirmative care for TNGC people” and stating that “[p]sychologists are encouraged to adapt or modify their understanding of gender, broadening the range of variation viewed as healthy and normative.”); TRANSGENDER CARE AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO (June 17, 2016), http://transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans7page=guidelines-terminology [https://perma.cc/4T8Q-CYVQ] (providing definitions of commonly encountered terms).

224 See, e.g., Nelson F. Sanchez, John P. Sanchez, & Ann Danoff, Healthcare Case Utilization, Barriers to Care, and Hormone Usage Among Male-to-Female Transgender Persons in New York City, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 713713 (2009), (“The prevalence of unsupervised hormone use reportedly ranges from 29% to 63% within urban groups of male-to-female transgender persons . . . .”); Jessica Xavier, Judith Bradford, et al., Transgender Health Care Access in Virginia: A Qualitative Study, 14 INT’L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 3, 12 (2013) (“Faced with many barriers to health care access, participants reported self-medication with transgender hormones to increase their passing ability and thus gain social acceptance.”); Stephanie L. Budge, Psychotherapists as Gatekeepers: An Evidence-Based Case Study Highlighting the Role and Process of Letter Writing for Transgender Patients, 52 PSYCHOTHERAPY 287, 288 (2015) (noting that as a result of barriers, many transgender individuals turn to the black market to obtain hormones).

225 Sanchez et al., supra note 195, at 713.

226 Id.

227 Sanchez et al., supra note 195, at 713;.

228 See text accompanying supra notes 136–151.

229 See Mifepris (mifepristone) Information, supra note 136, 180


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medication method can safely induce an abortion and is between 78 to 87% percent effective depending on dosage and ingestion. The side effects of using the one-drug regimen of misoprostol on its own are generally minimal and are similar to those associated with spontaneous miscarriage. Much research has pointed to the safety and efficacy of the single-drug regimen for medication abortion using misoprostol. WHO examined the safety of self-administered medication abortion using misoprostol alone, as opposed to the two-drug regimen that requires a doctor visit, and recommended the use of misoprostol alone in those settings where mifepristone is not available. The WHO safe abortion guidelines provide that misoprostol can be used alone to safely end a pregnancy through twelve weeks after the first day of the last menstrual period.

Medication abortion—that is, abortion without the need for surgery—was a technology not contemplated by the Supreme Court at the time that Roe was decided and eliminates the need for a medical gatekeeper to serve as an intermediary because it involves dispensing pills rather than performing surgery. There is evidence that large numbers of individuals turn to self-managed abortion in the face of the obstacles to accessing clinic-based care. Researchers recently found that significant

231 See Elizabeth Raymond, Efficacy of Misoprostol Alone for First-Trimester Medical Abortion: A Systematic Review, OBSTET. & GYNECOLOGY 137-147 (Jan. 2019) (describing that the results of a systematic review of research finds that the overall effectiveness of misoprostol alone was 78% but that higher doses and sublingual or vaginal delivery increased the efficacy of the single-drug regimen to 87%), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6309472/#:~:text=A%20systematic%20review%20published%20in,additional%20studies%20have%20been%20published.. See also, N.L. Moreno-Ruiz, et al., Alternatives to Mifepristone for Early Medical Abortion, INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS (Mar. 2007) (systemic review of research finds the efficacy of misoprostol alone in terminating pregnancy ranged from 84% to 96%), https://obgyn.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1016/j.jigo.2006.09.009. (..

232 Id. at 11.


234 R.J. Gomperts, K. Jelinska et al., Using Telemedicine for Termination of Pregnancy with Mifepristone and Misoprostol in Settings Where There is No Access to Safe Services, INT’L J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY at 1173 (Feb. 25, 2008). Misoprostol is readily available over the counter elsewhere in the world and is commonly used to induce abortion outside of clinical settings. Id. Indeed, in an effort to reduce the number of deaths due to illegal abortions throughout much of Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Persian Gulf, WHO recently put mifepristone and misoprostol on its Essential Medicines List. Id. at 1171.


numbers of pregnant people from immigrant communities are self-managing abortions through traditional herbal methods or by obtaining medication from one of the border mercados or at a pharmacy across the border in Mexico where misoprostol is sold over the counter without a prescription.\textsuperscript{237} The study found that in 2013 after the Texas legislature passed the controversial state law HB 2, which was the subject of the Whole Women’s Health case, that shuttered thirty of the state’s forty-eight abortion clinics, somewhere between 100,000 and 240,000 women of reproductive age living in Texas tried to end their pregnancy entirely on their own, without any medical assistance.\textsuperscript{238} Self-managed care allows individuals without access to clinic-based care to end their pregnancy safely, at low cost, in the comfort of their homes, and without the threat of clinic protesters and, for those with compromised immigration status, without fear of detention by immigration enforcement.\textsuperscript{239} In 2015 there were more than 700,000 Google searches using terms related to self-induced abortion in the United States.\textsuperscript{240} A 2014 national survey of abortion patients revealed that about 1.3% of them had attempted to terminate a pregnancy on their own using misoprostol, with another .9% using a method other than medication abortion.\textsuperscript{241} In each of these studies, individuals reported various reasons for turning to self-managed abortion care, including difficulty obtaining reproductive health services, inability to afford the cost of clinic-based care, wanting to avoid clinic-based care, not knowing that

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\textsuperscript{237} See Grossman et. al., TexPEP Policy Brief, supra note 14 at 3 (finding that in the wake of Texas’ passage of HB2, one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country, there has been an increase in the use of self-induction abortion through medication.) The study in Texas estimates that between 100,000 and 240,000 women have attempted to end their own pregnancies. Id. at 2. See also, Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of the DIY Abortion in Texas, ATLANTIC: (June 27, 2014), (discussing the growing use of restrictions on abortions as the reason for women to take matters into their own hands), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/ [https://perma.cc/VZ5N-EVDY].

\textsuperscript{238} See Grossman et. al., TexPEP Policy Brief, supra note 14 at 1-2.

\textsuperscript{239} See Yvonne Lindgren, The Doctor Requirement: Griswold, Privacy, and At-Home Reproductive Care, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 341, 360-61 (2017).


abortion was legal and that they could access clinic-based care, and preference for self-managed care as more natural and easier.\(^\text{242}\)

The technology that has given rise to direct-to-consumer access to abortion care follows larger trends in direct-to-consumer healthcare and self-managed care in healthcare. The next section considers alternative constitutional foundations beyond the cramped gatekeeper model that better reflect the new realities in abortion care and better protect the abortion right.

### III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABORTION RIGHT BEYOND THE GATEKEEPER

In 2019 a coalition of six medical organizations representing 560,000 frontline physicians issued a letter calling for an end to state legislators inserting politics into the practice and delivery of evidence-based medicine.\(^\text{243}\) In the open letter, the authors argued that “[t]he insertion of politics between patients and their physicians undermines the foundation of trust this relationship is built on and inhibits the delivery of safe, timely, and comprehensive care.”\(^\text{244}\) This section describes ways to re-envision and challenge the gatekeeper model: First, it examines alternative constitutional foundations that were necessarily foreclosed by the Roe Court’s decision to pursue the medical gatekeeper framing of the abortion right. It investigates what is left of the Supreme Court’s abortion holdings in the absence of the medical gatekeeper framing. Next, the section considers federal and state-level approaches to protecting abortion access by expanding direct-to-consumer access to medication abortion through the mail and pharmacies and expanding who can dispense medication abortion. Finally, this section reveals the high cost of the gatekeeper framework in the prosecutions of individuals suspected of terminating their pregnancies, a hazard that falls disproportionately on poor and marginalized individuals and communities. The section concludes that doing away with the medical gatekeeper framework is necessary as a question of criminal and reproductive justice as well as public health.

#### A. Constitutional Bases

In the years leading up to Roe, there were competing visions of the abortion right that were specifically foreclosed by the Court’s decision to frame the right as a decision between pregnant people and their doctors acting as gatekeepers. Feminists strongly opposed the medical reform model that sought to grant doctors greater discretion when making the abortion decision in consultation with


\[^{244}\text{Id.}\]
their patients. Rather than reform, feminists worked for outright repeal of criminal abortion laws and called for abortion on demand that would do away with providers as “moral gatekeepers” to abortion access. Feminists argued that abortion on demand was a necessary part of their agenda because abortion allowed women exclusive control over their reproduction and allowed them to shape their destinies. Indeed, the Court in Roe explicitly distanced its ruling from the feminist model, concluding that the right of privacy does not include “an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases” or “abortion on demand.”

While the Roe decision framed the abortion right as a right of privacy related to marriage, family, and childrearing, Justice Douglas’ concurring opinion argued that abortion was a right of health, describing the medical privacy right as “the right to care for one’s health and person and to seek out a physician of one’s own choice.” His concurrence argued that the term “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to seek healthcare free from bodily restraint and without compulsion by the state. Identifying abortion as a right of healthcare is a more appropriate framing for medication abortion and the larger revolution in consumer-directed healthcare that has emerged over the last nearly fifty years. Roe’s right of privacy related to marriage, family, and childrearing suggests the privacy of relationships, in Roe, the doctor-patient relationship. By contrast, a right of healthcare is identified variously as a “right to care for one’s health,” to seek a doctor of one’s choosing and to refuse and seek medical care, all more accurately describe the right of individuals to act autonomously without a doctor acting as an intermediary. Health care delivery generally, and abortion care specifically, has shifted away from the clinic and into the home. The transition to home-based healthcare has been spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological innovations such as telehealth, wearable sensors, and direct-to-consumer testing and monitoring devices.

Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey similarly identified abortion as a right of reproductive choice related to medical decisions, stating, “[j]ust as the Due Process Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to refuse medical treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain medical treatment, including a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy.” This characterization of the abortion right highlights that the ability to make healthcare decisions, including the right to access abortion-related healthcare, is an integral aspect of liberty. The autonomy of medical decision-making has been recognized in the right to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. While the courts have not yet extended the Cruzan holding to include the constitutional right to access

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245 See PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 125-27; GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 41. See generally LUKER, supra note 24 at 32-33 (discussing 19th century state laws that gave doctors unlimited discretion as to when an abortion was warranted).

246 PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 126.

247 See also Lucinda Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth Control and Women’s Liberation, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 245, 274-81 (Robin Morgan, ed. 1970) (detailing challenges to public abortion laws).


249 Roe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J. concurring).

250 Id. at 213 (describing “the freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk or stroll or loaf”).


252 Id. at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (emphasis in the original).

253 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (upholding the right of an individual to withdraw lifesaving hydration and feeding equipment after catastrophic brain injury left her in a permanent vegetative state).
medication, the federal government and thirty-eight states have adopted “right to try” laws that allow terminally ill people to access experimental drugs that the FDA has not yet approved as a matter of state law. Prohibitions on the use of self-managed abortion infringe on the liberty and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that the Court has recognized at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The technology of self-managed abortion care, along with evidence that it is being accessed by tens of thousands of people each year, reveals that the constitutional architecture that undergirds the abortion right needs to accommodate this new technology and changing practice. The medical gatekeeper model merely reflects a historic compromise between competing models, feminists, and medical organizations, but it not critical to the foundation of abortion jurisprudence. The abortion right must reflect the new reality of a medical landscape in which safe and effective self-managed abortion care is available and readily accessible. Self-managed care of any type—from abortion to self-managed dentistry and bone-setting—falls within an individual’s right to manage their health and make autonomous medical decisions.

B. Challenging Medical Restrictions with a New Direct-Access Model

It is a critical time to reassert the constitutional right of abortion, reframed as a right to directly access abortion-related healthcare. Self-managed abortion has laid bare what has been inherently problematic from the beginning: The Roe Court centered doctors and healthcare regulations as integral to the abortion right. This approach was arguably legitimate in a medical landscape in which abortions were necessarily surgical, and non-medical abortions were often lethal. However, the medical gatekeeper framing is onerous when abortion technology and widespread practice allows pregnant people to access safe and effective non-surgical self-managed abortions. It is time to once again reframe the abortion right in response to changing technology to better protect the right and access to abortion-related healthcare. As this section will describe, this is not the first time that the Court has reasserted the “central right recognized by Roe” while at the same time that it has adjusted the Court’s

254 See Abigail All. v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that patients do not have a right to access potentially life-saving experimental treatments).


256 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that, “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decision relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

257 Indeed, the dichotomy of safe legal abortion and its antithesis of dangerous back-alley “coat hanger” abortions have given way. As one recent activist suggested, “[i]magine if those old coat hanger pins warning against unsafe abortion were replaced by pins with pills on them to show we have access to this [safe] medication?” Cari Sietstra, Opinion: Alabama’s Terrible Law Doesn’t Have to Be the Future of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/opinion-abortion-pregnancy-misoprostol.html [https://perma.cc/A5S6-3HMT].

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analysis to respond to changing medical technology.\textsuperscript{258} This section highlights the extent to which then-current medical practice informed the \textit{Roe} Court’s framing of the abortion right\textsuperscript{259} and concludes that the time has come for current medical technology to inform the framing of the abortion right as a right that includes self-managed care.

The \textit{Roe} Court looked to “modern medical techniques” to reject opponents’ arguments that criminal abortion laws were necessary to protect women’s health. The Court relied heavily on the work of Cyril Means whose research had argued that nineteenth-century abortion laws had been driven by a desire to protect women from the dangers of surgical abortion.\textsuperscript{260} His report, drafted at the request of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, had unearthed evidence that when the advent of surgical abortion using instruments had replaced more traditional herbal abortifacients, abortions became more lethal and the high mortality rate from abortions had driven the states to pass criminal abortion laws across the nation in the mid-1800’s.\textsuperscript{261} In examining the historical record of why criminal abortion laws were passed, the \textit{Roe} Court described that “[w]hen most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. This was particularly true prior to the development of antisepsis.”\textsuperscript{262} The Court then goes on to explain that until the development of antibiotics in the 1940’s “standard modern medical techniques such as dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today.”\textsuperscript{263} Relying on medical data, the Court concludes that unlike earlier periods in which abortion “placed [a woman’s] life in serious jeopardy,” the safety of modern medical techniques for performing abortion made it safe, and in fact safer than, rates for normal childbirth.\textsuperscript{264} The changing medical technology of abortion was central to the Court’s concluding that the relative safety of abortion means that the State’s interest in protecting women from a harmful procedure had “largely disappeared.”\textsuperscript{265}

Many commentators have suggested that \textit{Roe}’s prominent medical framing and trimester framework were influenced by Justice Blackmun’s experience as in-house counsel for a hospital.\textsuperscript{266} The opinion references the state’s interests in protecting women’s health “in the light of present medical knowledge,” placing the point at the end of the first trimester based on “the now-established medical fact”

\textsuperscript{258} Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (describing that “[t]he adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central holding of \textit{Roe v. Wade} and we reaffirm that holding.” \textit{Id.} at 879.).

\textsuperscript{259} See, e.g., Hunter, \textit{Justice Blackmun, supra} note 11 at 172 (arguing that the Texas law was too vague) (citing Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Opinion of \textit{Roe v. Wade} (May 18, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 141, Folder 4)); LINDA J. GREENHOUSE, \textit{BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY} 87-88 (2005).

\textsuperscript{260} MURRAY & LUKER, \textit{supra note} 109 at 661 n. 6 (describing that the \textit{Roe} Court relied heavily on the work of Professor Cyril Means’ research that the history of abortion regulation was ushered in to protect women’s health).

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Id.} Note that his historical account has since been challenged by historians who have discussed that the campaign to criminalize abortion was driven by a professionalization campaign by doctors and racist fears of declining white middle class birthrates. \textit{Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note} 11 at 283-87 (describing the doctor’s professionalization campaign and fears over declining white middle-class birthrates that drove the movement to criminalize abortion in the 1860’s).


\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Id.} at 149.

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Id.}

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that until the end of the first trimester abortion is safer with respect to maternal mortality than normal childbirth.\textsuperscript{268} The safety of abortion relative to childbirth was central to the Court’s conclusion that in the first trimester a physician may decide with his patient to terminate a pregnancy free of state interference.\textsuperscript{269} The Court rejected the suggestion that “the woman’s right is absolute” but rather, states may impose reasonable regulations in the first trimester to protect maternal health, including qualifications of those who will be performing abortions, licensure of doctors, and the licensing of facilities in which abortions are performed.\textsuperscript{270}

The decision in \textit{Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey}\textsuperscript{271} offers further support that changes in abortion technology should prompt revision of the abortion right’s constitutional framework. In the case, the Court “reaffirmed the central holding of \textit{Roe}\textsuperscript{272} while discarding the trimester framework and lowering the standard of review from what was arguably strict scrutiny to the lower and more vague undue burden standard. The \textit{Casey} decision parses the constitutional core claim of the abortion right from its more ancillary framework. There the Court revised the framework—most notably \textit{Roe}’s trimester framework—because “time has overtaken some of \textit{Roe}’s factual assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973.”\textsuperscript{273} Critically, the \textit{Casey} decision offers a roadmap to retain the core constitutional abortion right sourced in liberty, autonomy, and gesturing toward Equal Protection\textsuperscript{274} while restructuring the framework vis-a-vis the medical model because of updates in medical practice and technology. In short, the Court parses the \textit{Roe} decision between its central holding that individuals possess the right to decide whether to bear or beget a child free from compulsion by the state and merely restructures the framework through which to analyze the right, the contested framework of the medical gatekeeper.

The technology of abortion has been transformed in the years since the \textit{Roe} and \textit{Casey} Courts crafted the abortion right guided by then-current medical facts related to maternal mortality risks inherent in the surgical procedure. As described above, most first-trimester clinical abortions involve non-surgical medication abortion.\textsuperscript{274} While mifepristone’s REMS requires in-person dispensing at a healthcare facility, the REMS does not require that it be dispensed in-person in the physical presence of a doctor, and yet state laws in at least nineteen states have required in-person dispensing by a doctor which effectively prohibit abortion by telemedicine.\textsuperscript{275} Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in \textit{FDA v. AGOC} homed in on this aspect of the disconnect between medication abortion and the imposition of onerous in-person dispensing requirements, describing that the Government has recognized that in-person healthcare during the pandemic poses a risk and yet, “[w]omen must still go to a clinic in

\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Id.} at 163 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{Id.} at 163.
\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Id.} at 153, 163.
\textsuperscript{271} 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Id.} at 860.
\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Id.} at 851-52, 856 (citing R. Petchesky, \textit{Abortion and Woman’s Choice} 109, 133, n. 7 (rev. ed. 1990)).
\textsuperscript{275} Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2020), \url{https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion}.
person to pick up their mifepristone prescriptions, even though physicians may provide all counseling virtually, women may ingest the drug unsupervised at home, and any complications will occur long after the patient has left the clinic.” She concludes by observing that “[t]his country’s laws have long singles out abortions for more onerous treatment than other medical procedures that carry similar or greater risks.”

The medical gatekeeper is obsolete in the context of medication abortion and has been transformed from the Roe and Casey Courts’ preoccupation with protecting pregnant people’s health to an obstacle for accessing care, a political pawn decried by the frontline doctors in their open letter to lawmakers.

There are many parallels between the current crisis in abortion care and the crisis in abortion care in the years leading up to Roe. In the pre-Roe period, criminal abortion laws lead pregnant people to seek abortion outside of the care of a doctor, and evidence of high maternal mortality rates from illegal abortion, unequal access to abortion for people who lacked resources, and doctors’ fear of criminal prosecution resulted in widespread calls for repeal and reform of criminal abortion laws from organizations as varied as medical organizations, religious groups, lawmakers, and feminists. High mortality and morbidity rates from illegal abortions lead religious clergy and feminist organizations such as the Clergy Consultation Service and the Jane Collective to set up underground counseling and referral services to safe abortion providers. One such underground network, the Jane Collective, a referral service for people seeking a safe illegal abortion, got its name because the individuals who used their referral service were told to tell the provider that “Jane” sent them. The Jane Collective eventually trained women in the organization to provide abortion, providing 11,000 safe abortions in the years before Roe.

In 1971, feminist activists Lorraine Rothman developed the menstrual

276 FDA v. ACOG, 141 S. Ct. 578, 580 (2021) (J. Sotomayor dissenting). Justice Sotomayor also addressed this issue during her questioning at oral arguments in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, noting that while a doctor could prescribe the medication to be taken at home, under the Texas law, even “when [a patient] could take it at home . . . now she has to travel 200 miles or pay for a hotel to get . . . two days of treatment[,]” Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2016), oral argument transcript, at 20.

277 FDA v. ACOG, 141 S. Ct. at 585 (J. Sotomayor dissenting) (citing Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 Yale L.J. 1428, 1430 (2106)).

278 Evangelical Christians, including the Southern Baptist Convention, were in support of legalization of abortion. Indeed, the Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution in the years before Roe calling on members to work for abortion’s legalization and leaders praised the Roe decision. During this period, many religious leaders made pro-choice arguments on explicitly religious and moral grounds. R. MARIE GRIFFITH, MORAL COMBAT: HOW SEX DIVIDED AMERICAN CHRISTIANS & FRACTURED AMERICAN POLITICS 202 (2017); ROBERT WUTHNOW, RED STATE RELIGION: FAITH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 273 (2012) (noting that between 1966 and 1972 most of the denominations affiliated with the National Council of Churches adopted statement in support of abortion).

279 See PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 128-29; GRIFFITH, supra note 279, at 203, 216-22, 238-39 (describing several religious organizations that worked tirelessly for legalization of abortion, most notably the Catholics for Free Choice and the Clergy Consultation Service that assisted women with procuring safe abortions in the years before Roe by referring them to abortion providers before abortion’s legalization).


281 Id.; PETCHESKY, supra note 31 at 128.
extraction machine designed for personal use as a way of accessing early-stage abortion without the help of a medical provider.  

Like in the pre- Roe era, underground organizations are springing up to get medication abortion into the hands of pregnant people outside of the channels of the medical establishment, people are being prosecuted for accessing self-managed abortion, and doctors' best practices for treating patients safely are being thwarted by outdated constraints handed down by courts and legislatures rather than by physicians themselves. In 2018, an international organization, Aid Access, began offering U.S. women access to medication abortion pills through the mail after an online consultation with a doctor.284 The program is designed to reach people who are unable to access clinic-based abortion because of domestic violence or because they live in areas without an abortion provider such as rural areas and states with few abortion providers.  

The pregnant person consults online with a doctor and, if the medication abortion protocol is appropriate, the two-drug regimen is sent to them through the mail via an international pharmacy in India.286 The organization has defied a warning letter issued by the FDA to Aid Access on March 8, 2019 that its actions violated the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.287288 An advocacy organization has established a legal helpline for people seeking information about self-managed abortion and legal advice for those facing possible criminal prosecution for managing their abortion or assisting others to self-managed abortion.289 The organization Plan C researches and holds informational meetings about the ways that people are accessing medication pills online, have put out a report card that ranks the online pharmacies offering abortion pills online, and is laying the


http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,906342,00.html [https://perma.cc/QHLN-KMGC].


285 FDA vs Aid Access, AIDACCESS, https://aidaccess.org/en/page/200797/fda-vs-aid-access. On September 9, 2019 the organization and its leader, Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, sued the FDA for seizing between two and ten doses of medication abortion pills that had been prescribed to U.S. women and for blocking payment by patients. The case is currently on appeal after the court sided with the FDA.  

286 McCammon, supra note 284. During its first year in operation in 2018, the organization received of over 11,000 requests from people in the U.S. requesting medication abortion drugs, and the organization filled 2,500 of those requests. The following year Aid Access filled a third of the 21,000 requests from the U.S. Donley, supra note 169 at notes 208-208.


groundwork for over-the-counter access to abortion pills.290 Currently, the group is recruiting doctors to offer medication abortion pills through the mail based on a broad interpretation of the REMS “dispensing” language for mifepristone.291 And there is anecdotal evidence that collectives in hubs across the country are procuring and dispensing medication abortion to individuals seeking to self-manage their abortions through an underground network. Researchers, advocates, and activists had also sought to reframe the issue of self-managed abortion to introduce the concept of “missed period pills” or medication designed to “bring down menses,” which creates an interstitial space in which a pregnancy has not been confirmed, but a menstrual cycle is delayed, in the same rhetorical sleight-of-hand that was used in the 1800’s to openly advertise abortifacients in “respectable” magazines at a time when abortion was illegal.292 Finally, researchers have called for over-the-counter availability of abortion medication—what they have dubbed “Plan C”—in light of the safety and efficacy of the two-drug regimen for self-administration.293 As in the years before Roe, restricted access to abortion has resulted in a groundswell of self-help networks designed to increase direct access to abortion outside of the clinical context.

The crisis in abortion care in the mid-1960’s lead to liberalizing abortion laws at the state level in places like California and New York and eventually lead to Roe v. Wade.294 Commentators have documented that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe did not catalyze social change, but rather, the decision came in the wake of decades of opposing movements working through courts and state legislatures to advance their legal goals.295 Abortion access has arguably reached such a point that the Supreme Court should be urged to revise its outdated abortion framework. In the meantime, as in the pre-Roe period, the work will have to be done at the state level. Unfortunately, like the pre-Roe period,
in states with restrictive abortion laws, abortion access will be readily available solely to those with means to travel and have private insurance to access it.

At least two courts have asserted the right of individuals to access abortion directly without a medical gatekeeper based on the undue burden analysis because of the lack of purported healthcare benefits requiring that pregnant people be in a doctor’s physical presence to end their pregnancies. The Ninth Circuit in *McCormack v. Herzog* held that an Idaho provision that required that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital violated the rights of women who wished to obtain pre-viability abortions from a physician prescribing FDA-approved medication abortions. Jeanne McCormack chose to end her pregnancy using misoprostol that she obtained online because there were no licensed abortion providers in southeastern Idaho where she lived, and the nearest abortion clinic in Salt Lake City would cost between four hundred and two thousand dollars. She obtained the pills online for two hundred dollars and successfully ended her pregnancy at home. Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in *Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine* struck down a regulation banning the use of telemedicine for medication abortion. The case involved a program set up by Planned Parenthood in Iowa in 2008 that used videoconferencing to provide abortion medications to more than 6,500 pregnant people in rural clinics. In 2010, the Iowa Medical Board conducted a study of the program and found that the telemedicine program was safe and met the prevailing standard of care. Despite these findings, the Iowa Right to Life organization put pressure on Governor Terry Branstad, who then replaced the board. The new board voted to halt telemedicine for abortions in Iowa. The court struck down the regulation banning the use of telemedicine, arguing that the imposition posed an undue burden on access to abortion without sufficient evidence that it protected pregnant people’s health.

Critically, these cases relied on an undue burden analysis which necessarily required that the restriction did not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a person seeking an abortion. The undue burden standard has resulted in endless litigation and as states attempt to test the limits of the vague standard, testing the outer limits of waiting periods, driving distances, and informed consent scripts, to name only a few. Indeed, the undue burden analysis has so significantly narrowed the courts’ inquiry in cases that challenge abortion restrictions that the nature of the right at stake—the right of bodily autonomy, of an individual to seek out medical care, and to make healthcare decisions—has languished. Replacing the medical gatekeeper model with a right to

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296 788 F. 3d 1017 (2015).
297 Id. at 1030.
298 Id. at 1022 n.5.
299 Id.
303 Id.

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directly access and self-manage abortion will dispense with the undue burden analysis, which will no longer define the depth and breadth of the abortion right.

The undue burden analysis that supports and enables the medical gatekeeper has limited the depth and breadth of the constitutional analysis of the abortion right. As Professor Caitlin Borgman has described, attempts to challenge abortion restrictions on other constitutional bases, such as bodily integrity, equal protection, and the right against compelled speech, are routinely subsumed by the undue burden analysis.\(^{304}\) In *Planned Parenthood Southwestern Ohio Region v. DeWine*,\(^{305}\) the Sixth Circuit downgraded the plaintiff’s bodily integrity claims, which normally would have been subject to strict scrutiny standard, using the lower undue burden analysis.\(^{306}\) The suit was a challenge to an Ohio law that required doctors to adhere to labeling requirements for mifepristone when dispensing medication for abortion. The challengers wanted to dispense lower dosages of mifepristone “off label” in accordance with significant research that lower doses of mifepristone in the two-drug medication abortion regimen were equally effective and less expensive to administer.\(^{307}\) Critically, the court, while addressing the bodily intrusion claim recognized that “individuals possess a constitutional right to be free from forcible physical intrusions of their bodies against their will, absent a compelling state interest,” the court found that the strict scrutiny standard does not apply when bodily intrusion involves abortion which must be analyzed using the lower undue burden standard.\(^{308}\)

Recognizing a right to directly access abortion would uncover the range of constitutional rights at stake in abortion restrictions currently masked behind the undue burden analysis. These include the right of bodily integrity, equal protection, and freedom from compelled speech.\(^{309}\) The right to directly access abortion without the forced intervention of a doctor falls within the right of pregnant people’s decisional autonomy to make choices about the care they will receive. Restrictions on access to medication abortion for self-managed care are more than regulations about how abortion-related healthcare is delivered; rather, decisions over medical care are at the heart of decisional autonomy. As Justice Blackmun described in his concurring opinion in *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*,\(^{310}\) the Due Process Clause must include protection of an individual’s decision to both obtain and refuse medical treatment, including the abortion decision.\(^{311}\) Similarly, Justice Douglas’ view that abortion was a right of health that included the right to seek medical care could form a foundation for recognizing a right of direct access to abortion.\(^{312}\) The compelled intervention of a doctor in abortion infringes on the liberty and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that is at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^{313}\)

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\(^{304}\) *See* Caitlin Borgman, *Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Premption*, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (2014) (describing that challenges to abortion restrictions based on claims of bodily autonomy, equal protection, and the right against compelled speech, are subsumed or displaced by the undue burden analysis).

\(^{305}\) 696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2012).

\(^{306}\) *Borgman, supra* note 304 at 1056-57.

\(^{307}\) *Id.* at 1057 (citing Planned Parenthood v. DeWine, 696 F.3d at 495.).

\(^{308}\) *Id.* at 1057-58 (citing Planned Parenthood v. DeWine, 696 F.3d at 506.).

\(^{309}\) *See id.* at 1055-56.


\(^{311}\) *Id.* at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J. concurring).


\(^{313}\) *See* Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that, “our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

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significant evidence reveals that large numbers of individuals are safely and effectively terminating their pregnancies outside of the care of a medical provider using pills procured online. The Roe Court looked to current medical practice of the early 1970’s and with a keen consideration of health risks to establish the gatekeeper model. The Casey Court revised the abortion right’s framework based on medical advances that left Roe’s trimester framework “unworkable.” The time has come once again for the abortion right to be revised in light of current medical technology to recalibrate the state’s interest in imposing a medical gatekeeper nominally designed to protect maternal health. While in the Roe period, abortions were surgical and arguably required a doctor to protect patient’s health, there is extensive research and compelling empirical evidence that neither doctors nor facilities fulfill the function integral to the Roe Court’s description of the abortion right. The fallacy of the medical gatekeeper has been brought into sharp relief during the global COVID-19 pandemic. The next section considers ways to enhance access to medication abortion at the state and federal levels.

C. Enhancing Direct Access at the State and Federal Levels

With the conservative shift in the Supreme Court, increasing access to medication abortion will have to take place at the federal level through legislation like the Women’s Health Protection Act and by changing FDA labeling to remove the in-person dispensing requirement for mifepristone with the ultimate goal of medication abortion available over-the-counter, what advocates have dubbed “Plan C.” At the state-level, increasing access to medication abortion will be propelled by making the pills more readily available and expanding the types of providers who can dispense the two-drug regimen.

The Women’s Health Protection Act is a federal bill introduced in 2019 that would protect abortion access by prohibiting state and local governments from imposing medically unnecessary restrictions. The Act creates a statutory right for health care providers to deliver abortion care and the right of their patients to receive carefree from medically unnecessary restrictions, including medically inaccurate informed consent “scripts,” medically unnecessary in-person visits, waiting periods, forced ultrasounds and other unnecessary tests, restrictions on prescribing medication abortion in early pregnancy, and pre-viability bans that are unconstitutional. The bill currently has 217 co-sponsors in the House and forty-three in the Senate.

Expanding access to mifepristone, the second drug in the two-drug medication abortion regimen, to allow its provision through the mail, through pharmacies, and ultimately, over the counter, would go a long way toward loosening the hold of gatekeeper on abortion access. Currently, the FDA labeling of mifepristone requires that it be dispensed by a certified provider at a healthcare facility which necessarily prohibits its distribution through the mail, via telemedicine, and through pharmacies. The Biden Administration has suspended the mifepristone REMS in-person dispensing requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic thereby allowing distribution through the mail and pharmacies

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during the pandemic.\textsuperscript{316} The selection of a new FDA commissioner could permanently release mifepristone’s in-person REMS and allow distribution through the mail and by pharmacies even after the pandemic has ended.\textsuperscript{318} In early February, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform submitted a letter calling on the FDA to lift the in-person requirement for medication abortion.\textsuperscript{320} Changing the labeling of mifepristone will greatly enhance access to medication abortion both inside and outside of the doctor-patient relationship.\textsuperscript{321} Despite its proven safety and efficacy, mifepristone is subject to a special designation by the FDA as needing a REMS which in the case of mifepristone requires that the drug only be provided to a patient by a certified provider at a healthcare facility.\textsuperscript{322} The REMS designation thereby makes it very difficult to administer mifepristone—and with it, the two-drug medication abortion regimen—via telemedicine, but also prohibits the drug from being obtained by retail or mail-order pharmacies. The certified provider requirement and implicit bans on the use of telemedicine for abortion have become a critical issue during the pandemic because it prohibits safe at-home medication abortion under a doctor’s supervision and requires that patients and providers alike risk their health by coming in-person to a clinic. As a result, lawmakers, healthcare researchers, abortion providers, and advocates have called on the FDA to change the REMS requirement for mifepristone.

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has also called upon the FDA to remove the REMS for mifepristone, arguing that the mifepristone REMS are “outdated and

\footnotesize{316 Belluck, \textit{supra} note 183 (describing that the Biden administration has suspended the in-person dispensing requirement for mifepristone during the COVID-19 pandemic); Letter dated April 12, 2021 from Janet Woodcock, acting commissioner of the FDA to the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, https://twitter.com/ACOGAction/status/1381781110980501512/photos/1 (stating that the agency would temporarily stop enforcement of the in-person dispensing requirement for the first drug, mifepristone, in the two-drug medication abortion regimen. during the COVID-19 pandemic).


\footnotesize{323} The REMS designation requires that a patient be handed the mifepristone at a clinic, medical office, or hospital under the supervision of a healthcare provider and that the healthcare provider must be registered with the drug manufacturer.}

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substantially limit access to . . . safe, effective medication.” 323 The American Medical Association and the American Academy of Family Physicians have also called upon the FDA to remove the REMS for mifepristone. 324 As these physician organizations point out, mifepristone has been singled out in being subjected to the burdensome REMS designation when it is four times safer than Viagra and fourteen times safer than childbirth. 325 Indeed, the FDA itself has acknowledged that “[t]he safety profile of . . . [mifepristone] is well-characterized and its risks well-understood after more than 15 years of marketing. Serious adverse events are rare and the safety profile of . . . [mifepristone] has not substantially changed.” 326 Dr. Daniel Grossman, a researcher, and professor of gynecology at the University of California, San Francisco, tweeted that, “[d]uring the pandemic, it would be possible to provide medication abortion through 11 weeks of pregnancy without an in-person visit & by mailing pills to a patient.” 327 Medication abortion with pills provided by mail would reduce the risk of transmission to both patients and providers and could be accomplished without the need for personal protective equipment, the alleged rationale behind designating abortion as a non-essential surgery during the pandemic. 328

The global COVID-19 pandemic has thus brought the issue of the medical gatekeeper into sharp relief. During the pandemic, the risk of seeking abortion in a medical facility is greater than in receiving medication abortion through the mail or at a pharmacy. 329 This is particularly true since many states’ onerous waiting periods require patients to stay overnight near an abortion facility, thereby

326 FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, App no. 020687Orig1s020, Ref. ID 3909589, at 3.
328 In a letter to Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, a coalition of anti-abortion organizations urged federal health officials to both designate abortion services as non-essential and “cease operations” to and to donate masks, gloves, and hospital gown to the corona virus response and to prohibit the expansion of medication abortion via telemedicine. See Sarah McCormon, Anti-Abortion Rights Groups Ask HHS to Urge End to Abortion During Pandemic, NPR (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/24/820730777/anti-abortion-rights-groups-ask-hhs-to-urge-end-to-abortion-during-pandemic [https://perma.cc/F6UQ-F8TQ]. See also, Federal Appeals Court Oks Arkansas’ Abortion Ban During Coronavirus Pandemic, NPR (Apr. 22, 2020) (noting that politicians sought to suspend abortions in some states and that abortion opponents sought to designate abortions as nonessential, which would lead to the preservation of medical supplies such as surgical masks and hospital gowns).
329 See supra note 4 at 5-7. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in FDA v. ACOG noted that the dangers of exposure to the virus while seeking abortions fell disproportionately on people living in poverty and people of color and because they often live in multi-generational households, the risk of exposure is not only to patients but to their families as well. FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) [J. Sotomayor dissenting].

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increasing the risk of exposure to COVID-19. In July, a federal district court in Maryland issued an injunction in *ACOG v. FDA*,[329] a case brought by medical providers and organizations against the FDA challenging enforcement of the FDA requirement of in-person mifepristone dispensing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Later in January, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and thus reinstated the in-person dispensing requirement. The injunction permitted providers to mail medication abortion pills to their patients. In the wake of the injunction, a handful of new start-ups began offering abortion care via telemedicine.[331] The new virtual clinics screened patients and then mailed the medication abortion pills to their homes, often using online pharmacies. Medication abortions are significantly less expensive than clinic-based abortions, costing in some cases $199 compared to $500 for an in-clinic medication abortion.[333] The brief window of time between the federal injunction and the Supreme Court’s decision to repeal the injunction in January gave a glimpse of how medication abortion access would rapidly expand if the in-person dispensing requirement was removed from mifepristone.

There is a push to expand access to medication abortion pills in those states that are protective of abortion rights. Recently, the state of California became the first in the nation to require that all public colleges provide medication abortion on all of its campuses.[334] A recently filed lawsuit is challenging a Maine law that prohibits advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) from providing medication abortion.[335] The suit relies on extensive research that proves the safety of APRNs providing early abortion care.[336] APRNs are already providing abortion care in California, Montana, Illinois, and New Hampshire. APRNs are less expensive than seeking care from a physician and are often already serving underserved populations that cannot afford to seek care from a private physician. This is a step toward breaking down the medical gatekeeper model and expanding direct access to abortion. Loosening the gatekeeper restrictions from FDA labeling to expanding providers who can administer medication abortion at the state level is critical for enhancing access in what may one day be a post-*Roe* legal environment. The permeability of state borders means that medication abortion easily accessible through online pharmacies in one state can more easily flow across state lines to reach those in need living in states with potentially complete abortion bans. The next section examines the

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332 Id.
333 See id. (noting that many of the telemedicine startups employ a feminist model of sliding scale fee of between $0 and $350 depending on what the pregnant person can afford).
harm of leaving the medical gatekeeper framework intact in an era of self-managed care: rising prosecutions of people suspected of terminating their pregnancies.

D. Challenging the Criminalization of Self-Managed Abortion Under the Gatekeeper Model

Stripping the medical gatekeeper framing from the abortion right will also meet important public health and reproductive and criminal justice goals. As described earlier, access to clinic-based abortion care is disproportionately denied to vulnerable and marginalized communities, including people living in poverty who are disproportionately of color, people with compromised immigration status, and living in rural areas. Pregnant people who cannot access clinic-based care due to cost, waiting periods, distance, and immigration surveillance are pushed to self-managed care because medication abortion significantly lowers the cost and difficulty of accessing abortion in a landscape in which abortion opponents have targeted the provider-patient relationship to restrict abortion access.337

While self-managed care offers an opportunity to increase access to abortion, the transformative potential of self-managed care is disproportionately denied to those whose reproduction is surveilled, restricted, and criminalized by the state. These communities are more likely to have their pregnancies subject to surveillance as the result of receiving public assistance, being supervised by parole officers, and under the care of public health systems.338 Thus, individuals who rely on public health and low-cost clinics and who do not have access to private physicians may choose to self-manage their abortion to avoid surveillance and the gauntlet of aggressive harassment and public shaming at abortion facilities in many cities.339

Prosecutors have relied on a myriad of criminal statutes, from pre-Roe criminal abortion statutes designed to protect pregnant people from third parties performing abortions, to child

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337 Journalist Linda Greenhouse summed it up, “if you think about it, it’s evident why opponents of abortion have begun to focus on the early nonsurgical procedure. Medical abortion is the ultimate in women’s reproductive empowerment and personal privacy.” (Greenhouse, supra note 135.).


339 See DAVID S. COHEN & KRYS TEN CANNON, LIVING IN THE CROSSHAIRS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). For descriptions by the Supreme Court of aggressive tactics used by anti-abortion protesters at clinics, see, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 709-10 (2000) (describing that demonstrations in front of abortion clinics, “impeded access to those clinics and were often confrontational . . . [including] counselors who sometimes used strong and abusive language in face-to-face encounters.”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994)(upholding thirty-six-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (invalidating the use of “floating buffer zones”); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 472 (2014)(describing protesters “who express their moral or religious opposition to abortion through signs and chants or, in some cases, more aggressive methods such as face-to-face confrontation”). See also, Brief of Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts & Planned Parenthood Federation of America in Support of Respondents at 1, 7-8, McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 WL 2882079 (2014)(no. 12-1168) (describing “thirty years of violent protests and patient harassment” at abortion clinics including the murder of two clinic employees).

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endangerment, and child abuse and neglect laws.\textsuperscript{340} To date, there have been at least twenty-one arrests of people who have ended their pregnancies or assisted another person in doing so.\textsuperscript{341} The range of laws that can be brought to bear to prosecute an individual for self-managing an abortion include pre-
\textit{Roe} era laws that criminalize self-induced abortion,\textsuperscript{342} fetal harm laws,\textsuperscript{343} laws regarding the disposal of fetal remains and concealing a birth,\textsuperscript{344} and pre-
\textit{Roe} criminal abortion laws that were never repealed and have languished in the criminal code to be revived by prosecutors seeking to punish pregnant people for self-inducing abortion.\textsuperscript{345} Some states have begun to pass laws specifically designed to prosecute pregnant people who self-manage their abortion care.\textsuperscript{346} Thirty-eight states now allow a pregnant person to be prosecuted for the unlawful death of a fetus, and not all of them exempt the pregnant person themselves from prosecution.\textsuperscript{347} These type of laws rely on medical professionals reporting suspected cases of pregnant people having self-induced an abortion.\textsuperscript{348} This type of criminal enforcement raises the possibility of individuals being prosecuted for poor pregnancy outcomes.\textsuperscript{349}

\textsuperscript{340} See Farah Diaz-Tello, Roe Remains for Now…Will it be Enough?, 45 HUM. RTS. 14, 15 (2020) (noting that “[p]erversely, while abortion has become safer than ever medically, it has become riskier legally in the United States”). See also, Patel Amicus Brief, \textit{supra} note 199 at 7 (stating that self-induction abortions may be the only accessible ones where legal restrictions and political barriers make clinic-based ones unattainable). For example, Purvi Patel was reported to authorities by a physician in the emergency room after she told hospital staff that she had miscarried. She was charged with necule and neglect of a dependent. She was convicted of both crimes and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Her conviction was later overturned. Patel v. State 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1062 (Ind.App. 2016)).

\textsuperscript{341} Diaz-Tello, \textit{supra} note 294, See also Roe’s Unfinished Promise: Decriminalizing Abortion Once and for All, White Paper, The Sia Legal Team 5-6 (noting that a threat of arrest may make an abortion experience traumatic).

\textsuperscript{342} Only seven states have these laws, which prohibit actions described as “self-abortion,” “soliciting,” or “submitting to” a criminal abortion. Roe’s Unfinished Promise: Decriminalizing Abortion Once and for All, White Paper, The Sia Legal Team 8-12.

\textsuperscript{343} Id. at 13-16.

\textsuperscript{344} Id. at 19. Critically, these laws were intended to protect, not prosecute, pregnant people who are victims of violence when pregnant. Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{345} Id. at 17-18.

\textsuperscript{346} In 2010, in response to a case of self-induced abortion, the Utah legislature amended the criminal code to give the state power to prosecute pregnant people who seek to terminate their pregnancies outside of the clinical context. State of Utah House of Representatives Bill No. H.B. 12, 2010.


\textsuperscript{348} See id. at 74. For example, Purvi Patel was reported to authorities by a physician in the emergency room after she told hospital staff that she had miscarried. See Patel, \textit{supra} note 294 at 1046.

\textsuperscript{349} See State v. Wade, 232 W. 3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (describing that the logic of allowing such prosecutions “would be extended to cases involving smoking, alcohol ingestion, the failure to wear seatbelts, and any other conduct that might cause harm to a mother’s unborn child”); Reinstein v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 736-37 (Ariz. App. 1995) (citing factors that may impact health at birth, including poor nutrition, vitamin and iron deficiencies, poor prenatal care, insufficient or excessive weight gain, and ingesting caffeine); Patel Amicus Brief, \textit{supra} note 199 at 22. In El Salvador, where abortion is completely banned, an estimated 129 women were charged with self-inducing abortion between 2000 and 2011 and at least twenty-six were convicted and given decades-long sentences. See, MICHELLE OBERMAN, HER BODY, OUR LAWS: ON THE FRONT LINES OF THE ABORTION WAR, FROM EL SALVADOR TO OKLAHOMA (Beacon Press 2018); Amnesty International, \textit{On the Brink of Death: Violence Against Women and the Abortion Ban in El Salvador}, London: AMNESTY INT’L. at 9, 35-36 (2014), http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/on_the_brink_of_death.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BSE-3DZM]. For example, in 2010, a pregnant woman suffered a miscarriage after falling down the stairs. She was arrested after she was reported to law enforcement by hospital workers. She was released when it was determined that she was not far enough along to charge her under Iowa’s fetal homicide law. See Amie Newman,
While technology has given rise to a new model in which individuals can exercise bodily autonomy outside of a relationship to a medical gatekeeper, prosecutors have responded by seeking to restrict access to self-managed healthcare through criminal prosecution. A public health harm-reduction model as well as reproductive justice call for replacing the gatekeeper model of the abortion right because the reproductive lives of marginalized individuals and communities are disproportionately subjected to both surveillance and criminal prosecution. What is more, in the midst of a global pandemic accessing medical care in person is dangerous and, in the case of medication abortion, is unnecessary. Thus, while individuals may be exercising greater autonomy in accessing care necessary for core constitutional rights of autonomy and privacy outside of regulation by the state, in response, states have begun to criminally prosecute people suspected of terminating their pregnancies outside of clinical supervision.

**CONCLUSION**

Abortion rates remain constant regardless of its legality, with abortion rates in the decades before Roe largely the same as in the decades after Roe. There has been a sea-change, however, with the development of medication abortion. When Roe was decided, surgical abortion meant that an illegal abortion was potentially lethal; now, a pregnancy can be safely and effectively terminated without the assistance of a medical provider with medication abortion pills procured online. Unlike in the pre-Roe period when pregnant people were dependent on finding a doctor willing to perform a surgical abortion or had to face the risks of a back-alley abortion, medication abortion allows people to safely terminate a pregnancy outside of the doctor-patient relationship. The symbolic coat hanger has been replaced by a two-drug regimen. At this historic moment, the gatekeeper model must be replaced by a direct access model that comports with modern abortion practice and is best able to protect access in the uncertain times ahead. Both the Roe and Casey opinions crafted their frameworks guided by the then-current medical technology of abortion. In light of current medical technology and

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330 Ironically, as medication abortion has become safer it has also become increasingly criminalized.

331 See Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 199 at 27-28. See also BRIDGES, supra note 338 at 66 (expressing that a woman in need exchanges government assistance for the surveillance of her body; Roberts, supra note 338 (discussing the impact of state surveillance on communities of color); Roberts & Vagle, supra note 338 (noting that the wide-ranging system of welfare surveillance of communities of color strips recipients of their dignity and privacy).


333 LUKER, supra note 24 at 19-20.

334 See Sietstra, supra note 226.

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evidence of significant direct access to online medication for self-managed abortion, the time has come to once again revise the constitutional framework of the abortion right to replace the outdated gatekeeper model with a direct-access framework. A constitutional right of abortion that is not dependent upon the role of doctors will allow pregnant people to directly access abortion-related healthcare without compelled doctor involvement. This will lower cost and increase access to those who are most vulnerable and marginalized. This is in line with current trends in consumer-patient-directed care more generally. Self-managed abortion reveals that the medical gatekeeper framing is obsolete, and the undue burden standard that was designed to maintain it is no longer relevant to the way abortion is delivered.